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NICARAGUA CANAL. 



LETTER 


FROM 


THE ACTING SECRETARY OF ff AR, 


IN RESPONSE TO THE 


SENATE RESOLUTION OF MARCH 29, 1894, TRANSMITTING 
A REPORT ON THE NICARAGUA CANAL IN ITS 
MILITARY ASPECTS, MADE BY CAPT. GEORGE 
P, SCRIVEN, OF THE SIGNAL CORPS. 



WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 

1894 . 




SO CO 


TC7H- 

|S C I+ 









53d Congress, ) 

SENATE. 

( Ex. Doc. 

2d Session. ) 


\ No. 74. 


IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. 


L E T T E R 


i-noM 


THE ACTING SECRETARY OF WAR, 

IN RESPONSE TO 

The Senate resolution of March 29, 1894, transmitting a report on the 
Nicaragua Canal in its military aspects , made by Capt. George P. 
Scriven , of the Signal Corps. 


April 6, 1894.—Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be 

printed. 


War Department, 
Washington , I). C., April 6, 1894. 

Sir : In response to tlie resolution of the Senate dated March 29, 
1894, I have the honor to transmit herewith a report on the Nicaragua 
Caual in its military aspects, made by Capt. George P. Scriven, Signal 
Corps, to the chief signal officer. The letter of the chief signal officer, 
dated April 5, 1894, submitting the report, is herewith. 

Very respectfully, 


Joseph P». Doe, 
Acting Secretary of War. 


The President of the U. S. Senate. 


War Department, Signal Office, 

Wdshington City , April 5, 1894. 

Sir : I have the honor to transmit herewith, as called for by Senate 
resolution of date March 29, 1894, a report on the Nicaragua ('anal in 
its military aspects, made by Capt. George P. Scriven, Signal Corps, 
U. S. Army, to the Chief Signal Officer. 

Very respectfully, 

A. AY. Greely, 

Chief Signal Officer. 


The Secretary of War. 









NICARAGUA CANAL. 


THE NICARAGUA CANAL IN ITS MILLTARY ASPECTS. 


$ A report to Rrig. Gen. A. W. Greely, Chief Signal Officer, U. S. Army, by Capt. George P. Scriven, 

Signal Corps.] 

“The natural interest of the United States in any connection through the American Isthmus has 
mot only been always emphatically expressed by the Government, but it lias been fully and distinctly 
recognized by other governments from the earliest period of our national existence.” (W. M. Evarts, 
when Secretary of State.) 

Since the days when Columbus, broken in hope and spirit by his fail¬ 
ure to find a westward passage to the Indies, returned from the last 
unsuccessful voyage along the coast of Yeragua, to die unheeded in 
Spain, the American Isthmus has stood a barrier against the commer¬ 
cial intercourse of the world. 

At first it was thought that nature could not have placed this nar¬ 
row, unbroken wall of land between the waters of the two great seas, 
and the early Spaniards, stimulated by the discoveries of Balboa and 
by the magnificent successes of Magellan, searched diligently for a pas¬ 
sage to the Pacific. The shores of the Gulf of Mexico were traced 
around every bay and indentation, each inlet of the Spanish Main was 
examined, and the coast of the Pacific was followed from Panama to 
California, before it was proved beyond a doubt that the western 
passage to the Indies was indeed but the “chimera of a splendid imagi¬ 
nation.” 

But long before the quest had been abandoned and almost a century 
before the English had learned that China could not be reached by the 
way of a Virginia creek, the Spaniards had established interoceanic 
•communication on the isthmus; and the trains of those wonderful gold- 
seekers, loaded with the merchandise of Peru, were crossing America 
from Panama to Porto Bello. But an easier passage was demanded, 
and while the grandson of Ferdinand and Isabella was still upon the 
throne, learned men of Spain* abandoning the hope of a natural pas¬ 
sage between the oceans, had conceived and advocated the idea of con¬ 
structing an artificial waterway across one of the three routes—Tehuan¬ 
tepec, Nicaragua, and Panama—whose relative advantages have fixed 
the attention of scientific men down to our own days. 

But the era of the search for the “ Secret of the Strait ” was that of 
greatest activity in geographical enterprise; it was followed in tropical 
America by a neglect that lasted from the days of Philip to the begin¬ 
ning of the present century. 

From the northern shores of the Mexican gulf indefinitely south¬ 
ward the continent had fallen under the control of Spain, and Spain 
lay benumbed beneath the weight of that line of weaklings who fol¬ 
lowed in pitiable diminuendo after the mighty Charles and his gloomy 
son. It is true that the idea of cutting a waterway through the isth¬ 
mus still occupied the minds of men, but it was ever growing weaker 
and more hazy, and finally disappeared amidst the darkness of bigotry 
.and clouds of war that closed over Spain towards the end of the six¬ 
teenth century. 

To the race of grand adventurers who first set foot on American 
shores, to Balboa, Ponce de Leon, Pizarro, Cortez, and a hundred 
others, there succeeded a horde of smaller robbers, who, as privateers, 
buccaneers, or- plain pirates, stole from friend and foe alike, and by 


* Notably Gomara, who as early as 1551 “ Urged on Phillip II the union of the 
oceans.” See article of Prof. .T. E. Nourse, quoted in Sullivan’s “ Problem of Inter- 
voceanic Communication,” etc. 



NICARAGUA CANAL. 3 

making tlie Spanish Main and its adjoining seas a terror to the world, 
did more to retard than to advance the cause of American progress. 

And so for two hundred years little was added to the geographical 
knowledge of the central regions of this continent, and little thought 
given to interoceanic communication, when Humboldt, early in the 
present century, again brought the subject before the world. ‘ But.the 
moribund hand of Spain still lay upon the greater part of America, 
and was not to be shaken off until revolt had followed revolt from the 
Sabine, the boundary between the United States and the territory of 
Spain as settled by the Florida treaty of 1819, to the Rio de la Plata, 
and the events of the early years of this century had forever lost to 
Spain the great world which Columbus had given to her. Then it was 
that the idea of an artificial waterway was again taken up, and the 
States of the Central Republic, in whose territory one, at least, of the 
‘‘historic” canal routes lay, began to consider the problem for them¬ 
selves, and the modern era of thought and discussion began. 

In the half century intervening between the independence of Span¬ 
ish-America and the era of scientific investigation of the isthmus, there 
were few'countries of Europe that did not show interest in the problem 
of transisthmian communication. Spain, Holland, France, England, and 
Belgium all had made attempts more or less serious to enter upon the 
work, either as governments, or by associations of their citizens. New 
Granada and the Central American states had been going up and down 
the world crying their concessions to any buyer, much as they do to-day, 
while Mexico had made some languid attempts to explore her own terri¬ 
tory of Tehuantepec, and even Holy Rome had been asked to help the 
good work on. 

The United States talked much about an American canal, and dis¬ 
cussed largely the various routes proposed between Goatzacoalcos and 
the Atrato, but, not being content with words alone, she sent the officers 
of her army and navy to investigate the actual difficulties involved in 
isthmian transit. The army had found a road to the Pacific through 
Col. Hughes, United States Topographical Engineers, who made the final 
surveys for the location of the Panama Railroad. The navy, through 
the gallant expedition of Strain and his men, had added one star more 
to her galaxy of glory. A citizen of New York, Mr. Kelly, had given 
his money and his efforts to the investigation of the Atrato route, and 
another American, Col. O. W. Childs, a civil engineer from Philadel¬ 
phia, had discovered the true “break in the Cordilleras.” 

Almost immediately after the events of the 15th of September, 1821, 
the States of the Central Republic of America, beginning to take 
thought for their own advancement, considered a plan conceived by 
Manuel a de la Corda, afterwards governor of Nicaragua, for the con¬ 
struction of an interoceanic canal; but the new government of the 
Five United Republics was too poor and weak to go farther than the 
preliminary discussion of the work.* 

In 1825, however, the minister of the United Provinces of Central 
America, urged to action by an application of English and American 
merchants for a concession, requested the cooperation of the United 
States in the construction of a water way across the isthmus. There¬ 
upon Mr. Clay, then Secretary of State, under instructions of the Presi¬ 
dent of the United States, John Quincy Adams, directed our repre¬ 
sentative in Central America to investigate the advantages which 
Nicaragua offered for a canal between the Atlantic and Pacific. Even 


See Nourse and Sullivan, ante. 



4 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


at this time, 1826, the hesitancy of the Government of the United States 
to undertake or even countenance the enterprise is evident from the 
explanatory remarks of Mr. Squier, who says: 

Although the administration of Mr. Adams did not at once fall in with the propo¬ 
sitions, this was not from want of interest in it, but simply because the Government 
did not wish to commit the country to any specific course until the feasibility of the 
enterprise and the leading facts concerning it should be better known and under¬ 
stood. 

That nothing of consequence resulted from this request of Central 
America was perhaps natural, especially when we consider the com¬ 
parative poverty of the countries, the engineering difficulties involved— 
at that day little less than insurmountable—and the imperfect knowl¬ 
edge of the physical characteristics of the isthmus. It may, however, 
be considered surprising that the United States now stands in the same 
attitude, half of hope and half of doubt, toward an American canal, 
since to-day no longer obtain the almost insuperable obstacles to con¬ 
struction of seventy years ago. While, then, it is true the construction 
of such a canal presents great difficulties, yet such difficulties can, we 
are assured, be overcome at a reasonable cost. 

The interest shown by the Central American States in 1825 gradually 
affected Mexico, and the latter Government caused to be examined the 
only line in its territorial limits then supposed to*be practicable, from 
the mouth of the Goatzaeoalcos to the Pacific. Nothing came of the 
Mexican surveys and this line was not proved to be impracticable until 
many years later. 

The sections of the isthmus upon which attention was still concen¬ 
trated were Tehuantepec, Nicaragua, Panama, and Darien; although 
the earlier attempts to devise a plan for cutting the first two had 
failed. In 1828- ? 29 a survey, under the direction of Bolivar, then Presi¬ 
dent of New Granada, was made of Darien at its narrowest part. This 
was the first attempt to supplement the efforts of the Spaniards under¬ 
taken three hundred years before, and though the efforts added some¬ 
thing to the small stock of knowledge then existing, yet it did little more. 

A year or two later, 1830, a proposition for the construction of a canal 
was made to the Congress of the United Central American States by a 
Dutch association, acting under the special patronage of the King of 
the Netherlands, that finally resulted in a contract. The terms of the 
agreement, briefly stated, provided that the canal, when constructed, 
should be open to all nations at peace with Central America; that armed 
ships were not to be permitted to pass through without a special per¬ 
mission, and never when belonging to a nation then at war; and that 
the Central American Government was bound to use its best efforts 
with other nations to induce them to secure the neutrality of the canal. 
The cost of building was to be borne by the Dutch company, but the 
tolls were to be fixed by the company and the Central American Gov¬ 
ernment together. The Netherlands and the United States were put 
on an equality in respect to navigation and commerce, but it would 
seem that certain conditions gave to the Dutch flag privileges not 
accorded to the United States. These conditions excited opposition on 
the part of our Government, which formulated its opinions thereon 
through Mr. Livingstone, then Secretary of State. 

The Dutch project failed, and in the correspondence of Mr. Savage, 
then consul at Guatemala, and acting as representative of the United 
States in the matter, the following significant passage occurs: 

All concur here [Guatemala,] and everyone seems tacitly to look forward to the 
United States for the completion of this grand project. They say that the United 
States, identified in her institutions with this Government, is the only power that 
ought to have preference. 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


5 


Shortly after this failure negotiations were again opened with Hol¬ 
land, and Nicaragua showed herself particularly favorable to the Dutch 
attempts, but again nothing was done. 

About this time interest in a transisthmian canal was again awakened 
in the United States, and in 1835 resolutions relating to it passed the 
Senate. This action was, in 1839, followed by a memorial from citizens 
of New York to the House of Representatives, in which were recom¬ 
mended measures similar to those already passed by the Semite of the 
United States. They requested that the President— 

consider the expediency of opening negotiations with the governments of Central 
America and New Granada for the purpose of effectually protecting, by suitable 
treaty stipulations with them, such individuals or company as may undertake to 
open a communication between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by the construction 
of a ship canal * + * and of further securing forever by such stipulations the 

free and equal rights of navigation of such canal to all nations. 

Again the dominant interest of the United States in the canal was 
made plain and her authority asserted. 

In compliance with this resolution Mr. Charles Biddle was appointed 
a special agent to proceed to the isthmus to make inquiries regarding 
the work, and to obtain all possible information regarding the conces¬ 
sion accorded by the Congress of New Granada to a certain Baron 
Thierry. This granted him (Thierry) the exclusive privilege of con¬ 
structing a canal between the river Chagres and the Rio Grande; it 
was afterwards annulled. About this time Gen. Morazin, the great 
President of Central America, became interested in the question of 
oceanic transit so far as to have a survey made of the Nicaragua route 
by Mr. Bailey, k. m., and about the same time authority was given by 
Nicaragua and Honduras for the formation of a canal company in 
France. Later becoming an independent state Nicaragua entered into 
a contract with agents of an American company for the building of a 
canal; and even Rome was approached on the subject of canal con¬ 
struction by the bishop of San Salvador. In fact, concessions were 
now to be had for the asking. 

New Granada issued a grant to a French company, and the French 
Government went so far as to send an agent to survey a line across 
Panama. In 1843 M. Guizot, prime minister of Louis Phillipe, in a 
speech before the Chamber of Deputies, drew the conclusion that such 
a work could only be accomplished by the cooperation of the great mari¬ 
time powers.. In 1844-1846 the representatives of Nicaragua in France 
and Belgium entered into contracts, the former with a private company, 
the latter with LouisJS’apoleon, to build a canal, but both attempts failed. 

Then it was that the United States took the first decided step in the 
direction of transisthmian communication, and negotiated a treaty with 
New Granada, under the terms of which the present Panama Railroad 
was constructed and the neutrality of the isthmus guaranteed by the 
United States. 

In this slight sketch of the development of an enterprise which was 
inteuded to improve the transit of the American Isthmus, we have now 
arrived at the period succeeding our war with Mexico. The vast area 
then added to the territory of the United States, followed by the dis¬ 
covery of gold in the far away California, naturally drew attention to 
the importance of providing means of speedy communication witli the 
Pacific coast region of the United States; and the successful construc¬ 
tion and operation of the Panama Railroad directed attention more 
strongly than ever to the isthmus. Attempts were made to secure 
from the Mexican Government for the United States the right of transit 
across Tehuantepec, but the proposal was peremptorily rejected, 


6 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


although the original proposition contained conditions that were thought 
to be very advantageous to the latter country. But the stream of inter- 
oceanic travel was not to be checked. Boutes were speedily established 
across the three historic sections of the American Isthmus, and they 
became the common roads to California. Panama had its railroads, 
Nicaragua its steamer line, and Tehuantepec a coach road, traces of 
which are seen to this day among the foothills of the sierras. 

In 1849 the first really important step was taken toward the construc¬ 
tion of that canal which, it is believed, will prove the solution of inter- 
oceanic communication. This step, made through the efforts of Mr. 
Squier, the able representative of the United States in Nicaragua, had 
its initiation in a charter granted to the American Atlantic and Pacific 
Ship Canal Company of New York. Under the charter Col. O. W. 
Childs made an examination of a route across Nicaragua from Greytown 
to Brito, and established the line subsequently followed, in the main, by 
the present (projected) canal. To Col. Childs also is due the location 
of the lowest point, 152 feet above the sea, of the interoceanic ridge in 
the mountain chain that extends from the northern ice fields of Pata¬ 
gonia. The company thus chartered failed to carry out the work, but 
it retained certain privileges in the transit of passengers across Nica¬ 
ragua which insured that route a large proportion of the California 
traffic of forty-five years ago. 

In 1853 the right to construct a railroad across Tehuantepec was 
conceded by Mexico in the Gadsden treaty, a privilege that was never 
used. 

However, the interest in the transit of the American Isthmus was 
then as now not confined to the United States alone, but it was world 
wide, so that nearly every nation took a more or less active part in the 
study and investigation of the problem. At first efforts were chiefly 
confined to the exploration of Darien, which, as the best known, was the 
most attractive of the routes suggested. In 1850 the project of a ship 
canal across Darien was brought forward by Edward Cullen before the 
Royal Geographical Society. This resulted in the sending of an en¬ 
gineer, Mr. Lionel Gisborne, to make the necessary surveys, and Dr. 
Cullen succeeded in obtaining for himself and others concessions from 
the Colombian Government granting the exclusive privilege of cutting' 
a ship canal across Darien between Caledonia Bay and the Gulf of San 
Miguel. As a result of a favorable report and through the efforts of 
Gisborne and others, a kind of international attempt was made in 1854 
to survey the Isthmus; war ships of Great Britain assembled to assist 
in the enterprise, and Col. Codazzi, of the topographical department of 
New Granada, was selected to represent that Government in the under¬ 
taking. 

It is said, however, that no stipulations existed between the United 
States, England, France and Granada, regarding the project; and be¬ 
yond the feeble attempts at exploration made by Commander Provost, 
of the British Navy, and the unfortunate expedition of Lieut. Strain, 
U. S. Navy, little resulted from this gathering of war ships. Strain’s 
journey was fruitless in scientific results, but it was one of the most 
gallant of the many glorious explorations made by the United States 
Navy, and its story will never fail to excite admiration. • 

Further efforts seemed necessary to prove the impracticability of the 
Darien route, and under the direction of the Frenchman, M. Roger, and 
then of M. Bourdiol, further surveys were undertaken which resulted 
as had all others, in nothing. 

Before the quasi-international attempts that ended so disastrously 
had been abandoned, investigations had been undertaken at the insti- 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


7 


gation of Mr. F. M. Kelley, of New York, and tlie results laid before 
the Royal Geographical Society of London, the British Institution of 
Civil Engineers, the Emperor Napoleon, and the scientists of Germany. 
Out of these independent efforts of an American citizen, highly com¬ 
mended in England, France and Germany, grew the action taken by 
Congress in March, 1857, when it was enacted that the Secretaries of 
War and the Navy be authorized, under the direction of the President,, 
to employ such officers of the Army and Navy as may be necessary for 
the purpose, to make explorations and verifications of the surveys, 
already completed of a ship canal near the Isthmus of Darien, to con¬ 
nect the waters of the Pacific and Atlantic by the Atrato and Tuira 
rivers. 

Under this act, Lieut. N. Michler, of the Army, and Lieut. Craven, 
of the Navy, were selected to make necessary examinations of the 
isthmus, with immaterial results, however. These efforts were followed 
by surveys, again instigated by Mr. Kelley, as well as by the investi¬ 
gations of De Puydt, Gogorza, De Lacharme, and Flacliet, none of which 
were attended with results of especial value. In 1860 the so-called 
Chiriqui route was started by a commission formed for another pur¬ 
pose by Congress, but full observations thereof were not made. 

While these surveys were going on in the east, investigations had 
been commenced in Nicaragua, as well as in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, 
though with small results. 

In 1846-H7, the concession previously granted by the Mexican Gov¬ 
ernment to Gray and assigned to an English company was reassigned 
to the Tehuantepec Kailroad Company, and from this action arose the 
Williams surveys, which had for an object merely the transit of the 
isthmus by land transportation. It was not until after the thorough 
survey of Captain, now Admiral Shufeldt, U. S. Navy, that the im¬ 
practicability of the Tehuantepec as a canal route was fully recognized, 
and the project transformed into a plan for a skip railway, which Mr. 
Eads strongly advocated some ten years ago. In Honduras, while no 
special surveys seem to have been made, looking towards the con¬ 
struction of a canal, yet this part of the isthmus was found to afford 
excellent facilities for railroad communication. 

Such, briefly, is the story of the attempts of nations and individuals 
to solve the problem of water transit across the isthmus of America 
from early days down to the time when the serious efforts of the United 
States began. Perhaps it is not too much to say that the later efforts 
upon which nearly all our present knowledge is based owe their incep¬ 
tion and development to the endeavors of Admiral Daniel Amrnen, U. 
S. Navy. First taking up the study of the isthmus from an interest in 
Strain’s stories, Arnmen went on, with growing interest, to the prob¬ 
lem ot transit itself, and finally arrived at certain conclusions which he 
set forth in an able paper read in 1860 before the American Geographi¬ 
cal Society. He thus brought again the subject of iuteroceanic transit, 
fairly before the country. But the disturbed conditions of the country 
were unfavorable to action, and little thought was given to the project 
until the close of the war, when Gen. Grant then, in 1866, commanding 
the armies of the United States, took up the subject earnestly, and by 
the appointment of a commission, already noted, laid the foundation of 
that knowledge upon which/has rested the hopes of the present genera¬ 
tion for the construction of a water way between the American oceans. 
The explorations set on foot by Gen. Grant and the results that have 
flowed from them have already been sufficiently outlined. 

These efforts to solve the problem of the isthmus, though admirable 


8 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


in themselves, had not gone far towards establishing the practicability 
of a water way. Little had been accomplished towards the selection of 
a route, and few lessons could be drawn from the incomplete surveys. 
Indeed the history of the explorations of the isthmus from the earliest 
times down to the year 1870 is hardly more than a record of individual, 
unscientific, and partial efforts. 

During these experimental years, the attitude of the United States, 
like that assumed to-day,was one of watchful noninterference in schemes 
that had not taken form, and in canals that were constructed only on 
paper. Nevertheless her interests in all planfe for crossing the isthmus 
had been clearly announced. 

One of the first acts of the Central American Republic, after inde¬ 
pendence, was to ask aid of the United States in this work, and as early 
as 1820 our interest was acknowledged. Again, in 1839, it was unmis¬ 
takably proclaimed by Mr. Mescer in his report to the House of Repre¬ 
sentatives. 

But undoubtedly the strongest evidence of the early interest of this 
country in a line of transit between the two oceans is the treaty of 
1846 with New Granada, by which the “United States guaranteed posi¬ 
tively and efficaciously the perfect neutrality of the isthmus.” This 
would probably be looked upon to-day as a dangerous and entangling 
alliance by statesmen of a certain school, yet it has proved an alliance 
from which nothing but good has come in the almost fifty years of its 
existence. 

But the European world in the meantime was also interested in 
canal construction, and was engaged in more or less active cooperation. 
England, however, our arch rival in America, seemed to be an idle, 
if interested, spectator. But this attitude was a mere seeming, and 
England was in reality busy in obtaining from corrupt officials and 
from drunken natives claims to American territory, which, though 
shadowy in fact, were sufficiently real in appearance to give a claim to 
British interference in Central American affairs. 

Her encroachments had been noted in France as early as 1843, and 
M. Guizot, before the Chamber of Deputies in that year, in speaking of 
the important effect that an American canal must have upon the com¬ 
mercial relations of Europe, warned France against remaining inactive 
in view of the threatened policy of occupation in Central America then 
pursued by England. But the warning seems to have passed unheeded 
both in France and in the United States until some few years later it 
was found that these same shadowy English claims to Mosquito terri¬ 
tory were proving formidable obstacles in the way of an American com¬ 
pany which then proposed to construct a canal across Nicaragua; there¬ 
upon followed the much discussed and still embarrassing Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty of 1850. 

The causes which led to this treaty between Great Britain and the 
United States were succinctly set forth by the Secretary of State, Mr. 
Bayard, in his dispatch of November 23, 1888, to our minister to Great 
Britain, Mr. Phelps (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1888, part 
1, p. 760 et seq.). The provoking cause of this dispatch was the action 
of the British minister in Central America, Mr. Gastrell, in complain¬ 
ing “that the Government of Nicaragua had established a post-office 
at Bluefields,thus intervening in the domestic affairs of the reservation”; 
that “troops and a police force have been stationed, and forts, arsenals, 
and military posts have been established, or are about to be established, 
by Nicaragua ” within the Mosquito reservation, and that the Nicaragua 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 9 

commissioner residing in the reservation sustains these acts. He states 
that— 

In the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government, erection of forts, arsenals, or military 
posts, the establishment of post-offices by Nicaragua or the exercise of military or 
police authority within the territory of the reservation can not be reconciled with 
the spirit of the treaty of Managua of 1860 as interpreted by the award of the Em¬ 
peror of Austria. 

Mr. Bayard, reciting a previous claim of Great Britain that the Mos¬ 
quito Indians were an independent nation, says: 

Two British frigates on January 1, 1848, took forcible possession of the town of 
San Juan del Norte, subsequently known as Grey town, which had a peculiar impor¬ 
tance to the people of the United States as being situated at the Atlantic mouth of * 
the projected Nicaragua Interoceanie Canal. For upwards of twelve years the 
protectorate of Great Britain thus established continued. 

The pretensions of Great Britain excited marked interest and opposition in the 
United States and, together with other circumstances, became the cause of the nego¬ 
tiations of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of April 19, 1850. By the terms of that 
instrument the Governments of the United States and Great Britain agree that they 
will never occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any dominion over 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America, nor 
will either make use of any protection which either affords or may afford, or any 
alliance which either has or may have to or with any State or people, for the pur¬ 
pose of * * * occupying, fortifying, or colonizing Nicaragua, the Mosquito 

coast, or any part of Central America, or of assuming or exercising dominion over 
the same. 

Mr. Bayard went further and stated the policy of the United States 
in the following language: 

The President can not but regard the continued exercise of the claim on the part 
of Great Britain to interfere on behalf of these Indians (Mosquitos) as the assertion 
of a British protectorate in another form; more especially when this effort is 
directed to prohibiting Nicaragua from exercising military jurisdiction in the imme¬ 
diate neighborhood of the Atlantic mouth of the projected caual. * * * 

The United States can never see with indifference the reestablishment of such a 
protectorate. * * * 

Whether the interference of the British Government be regarded as a breach of 
existing treaty engagements, or whether it be looked upon simply as an effort, not 
prohibited by expressed agreement, to extend her influence to this continent—in 
either case the Government of the United States can not look upon such acts without 
concern! 

It is by uo means certain that the United States is yet free from the 
contingency of British aggression and assertiveness in Central America. 

The beginning of the era of real progress towards the construction of 
an interoceanie canal dates back hardly more than twenty years, and 
was due to the clear-headed and far-sighted policy of Gen. Grant, then 
President of the United States. Incited to an interest in the question 
by Admiral Ammon, of the U. S. Navy, who had made the transit of 
the Isthmus his life’s study, Gen. Grant, when commander in chief, in 
a letter concerning a canal to Rear-Admiral C. H. Davis, U. S. Navy, 
said: 

I firmly believe the scheme practicable, and if it is, there is no doubt but that in 
this age of enterprise the work will be done. I regard it as of vast politico 1 import¬ 
ance to this country that no European government should hold such a work. 

But lack of knowledge w^s still the barrier to all exact plans, for 
so little was really known about the Isthmus that the same Admiral 
Davis, in reply to a resolution of Congress, makes, in 186b, the remark¬ 
able statement that— 

There does not exist in the libraries of the world the means of determining even 
approximately, the most practical route fora ship-canal across the Isthmus. 

And so it happened that in March, 1872, Gen. Grant, in accordance 
with an act of Congress, appointed a commission consisting of Brig. 


10 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


Gen. A. A. Humphreys, Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army; Prof. C. P. 
Patterson, Superintendent U. S. Coast Survey, and Admiral Daniel 
Ammen, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, to consider the subject of 
communication by canal between the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans. 

It was under the direction of this commission that the first really 
scientific, general explorations of Central America were undertaken. 

The first party to enter the field was that of the Darien expedition, 
under charge of Commander Selfridge, U. S. Navy, and its work was 
carried on by one party or another for the five years from 1870 to 1875. 
A second expedition under Capt. Shufeldt undertook the survey of 
4 the Isthmus of Tehuantepec; while a third, first under Commanders 
Crossman and Hatfield, then under Capt. Lull, was sent to examine 
again the Nicaragua route already carefully surveyed by Childs. 

This series of explorations, undertaken by the officers of the U. S. 
Navy, terminated with surveys of the Panama and San Bias routes. 
After this a long and careful study was made of the results, and on 
February 7, 1876, the commission reported unanimously iu favor of a 
line from Greytown to Brito, across the territory of Nicaragua, as the 
most favorable route for a canal between the Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans. 

So it may be said that the Nicaragua route is that selected by the 
United States for an American canal. 

However, this decision of the commission did not settle the matter in 
Europe, and in 1876 an officer of the French navy, Lieut. L. B. Wyse, 
was sent to Central America to make further explorations, under the 
auspices, not of the French Government, but of the u Societe Inter¬ 
nationale du Canal Interoceanique.” It is probable that these surveys 
were partial and unreliable, but they resulted in the selection of two 
routes through Colombian territory which were again examined in 
1877-N8. Early in the latter year a concession was given to a French 
company by the United States of Colombia, embracing the entire terri¬ 
tory of that country and covering all proposed routes for a canal, except 
those through Nicaragua and Tehuantepec. 

To these efforts of Lieut. Wyse succeeded the Paris conference of 
which M. de Lesseps was president, and on May 29, 1879, it was 
declared that— 

The conference deem that the construction of an interoceanic canal, so desirable 
in the interests of commerce and navigation, is possible, and in order to have the 
indispensable facilities of ease of access and of use, which a work of this kind should 
offer before all others, it should be built from the Gulf of Limon to the Bay of 
Pahama. 

The story of the attempt to build this canal at Panama, from its vain¬ 
glorious beginning, through its extravagant and reckless continuation, 
to its criminal close, is too well known to need recital here. It is 
probable that generations of men will come and go before the lessons 
are forgotten and before another spadeful of earth is removed by 
France from the soil of the American Isthmus. 

But while the eyes of the world were fixed on Panama the United 
States was quietly continuing its investigations in Nicaragua, and in 
1884 a treaty was arranged between this country and Nicaragua, by 
which it was provided that the construction of a canal should be under¬ 
taken by the former Government, and Mr. A. G. Menocal, U. S. Navy, 
already frequently employed in the surveys of this route, was sent to 
make additional investigations. 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


11 


But the treaty of 1884, after having been submitted to the Senate of 
the 1 nited States, was withdrawn by the President, Mr. Cleveland, and 
in 1887 the Republic of Nicaragua granted a concession to build the 
canal to an association of citizens of the United States, called the 
Nicaragua Canal Association. From this association was organized, 
under the laws of the State of Colorado, a construction company; then 
a company called the Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua was 
chartered by Congress February 20, 1889; and this Maritime Canal 
Company, by contract with the construction company, is now building 
the canal across Nicaragua. The Republic of Costa Rica afterwards 
assented to the arrangement so far as her interests were concerned. 

The concession granted to the Nicaragua Canal Association provided 
for the exclusive privilege to build and operate the canal for ninety- 
nine years, and further that the people of all nations shall be invited 
to contribute capital. From the articles of the concession referring to 
neutrality and defense it appears that the neutrality of the canal is, in 
the first instance, guaranteed by Nicaragua alone; but this guaranty 
is supported by a kind of hazy assumption that additional security will 
be thrown around the canal at some future time by some action of one 
or more of the great powers. 

The clauses of the concession most interesting from a military point 
of view are the following: 


Article VI. The Government of the Republic (Nicaragua) declares that during 
the term of this concession the ports at each extremity of the canal, and the canal 
itself from sea to sea, to be neutral, and that consequently transit through the 
canal in case of war between two powers, or between one or more and Nicaragua, 
shall not be interrupted for such cause : and that merchant vessels and individuals 
of all nations of the world may freely enter the ports and pass through the canal 
without molestation or detention. 

In general all vessels may pass through the canal freely, without distinction, 
exclusion, or preference of persons or nationality, provided they pay the dues and 
observe the regulations established by the grantee company for the use of the said 
canal and its dependencies. The transit of foreign troops and vessels of war will 
he subjected to the prescriptions relating to the same established by treaties be¬ 
tween Nicaragua and other powers, or by international law. But entrance to the 
canal will be rigorously prohibited to vessels of war of such powers as may be at 
war with Nicaragua or with any other of the Central American republics. 

Nicaragua will endeavor to obtain from the powers that are to guarantee the 
neutrality that in the treaties that shall be made for that purpose they shall agree 
also to guarantee a zone of land parallel to the canal and also a maritime zone in 
both oceans, the dimensions of which shall be determined in such treaties. 


Article VIII provides that— 

The present concession is transferable only to such company of execution as shall 
be organized by the Nicaragua Canal Association, and in no cases to governments or 
to foreign public powers. Nor shall the company cede to any foreign government 
any part of the lands granted it by this contract, etc. 

Article XXXII provides that— 

The Government (of Nicaragua) will establish such regulations as it may judge 
necessary to prevent smuggling and to maintain public order in the region of the 
canal. The company is bound to lend its assistance for the enforcement of such 
regulations: but in the free zone, along the margin of the canal, as hereinafter pro¬ 
vided, measures for the prevention of smuggling shall be limited to vigilance on the 
part of the employes, etc. 

Article XXXVII provides that— 

The Government shall establish all along the line of the canal included between 
the two terminal ports such police stations and revenue offices as in its judgment 
are necessary to preserve order in the region of the canal and for the observance of 
the fiscal laWs of the Republic. * * * The company, however, shall have the 

power to establish guards and watchmen for the service of the canal and the enforce¬ 
ment of its regulations. 


12 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


The canal, then, is to be closed only u to vessels of war of such powers 
as may be at war with Nicaragua or with any other of the Central 
American republics.” The police protection is left to Nicaragua and 
the company. It is probable that the weak and vague safeguards 
granted by the concession can not remain satisfactory to the builders 
and owners of this great work after it shall have been completed; nor 
could they be satisfactory to the United States. But it may be assumed 
that before the canal is completed the great nations of the world will 
have come to an understanding in regard to the status of this highway. 
What that status may be it shall be my endeavor to show. 

Such is an outline of the attempts made to solve the problem of inter- 
oceanic communication from the earliest efforts of civilized man to the 
scientific investigations of the past twenty years and the French 
failure of to day. The problem has belonged to all nations, yet none 
has done so much towards its solution by persistent effort and syste¬ 
matic research as the United States. 

The line chosen by her officers in 1876 remains to-day the only one 
that attracts the serious attention of the world. Panama is a failure; 
Tehuantepec has long since been abandoned as a jmssible route, and 
there remains but Nicaragua to realize the old dream of a waterway 
across America—a western passage to the Indies. 

But great as is the historical interest of the United States in the 
Nicaragua Canal, her other interests are fat greater. They are mani¬ 
fold, and though it is with the military aspect of the waterway that this 
paper is chiefly concerned, both the commercial and political aspects 
are so intimately connected with the military that a glance at each 
may well be given. 

By no less authority than a President of the United States (Mr. Hayes 
in his message to Congress, March 8,1880), it was asserted that the com¬ 
mercial interest of the United States in a canal between the Atlantic 
and Pacific oceans is greater than that of any other country of the 
world. But it is not probable that this claim will be unreservedly 
admitted by Europe, and certainly not by England, in view of the great 
advantages a canal will give to her trade with South America and with 
the Pacific colonies and of her heavy preponderance of ocean tonnage. 
But the claim will probably prove true for the time and conditions exist¬ 
ing when the canal shall have been built. 

At present more than one-half of the seagoing tonnage of the world 
sails under the British fiag; # less than one-tenth (8-22 per cent) carries 
American register, while the Norwegians come third, with 7T7 percent; 
Germany fourth, with 7-07 per cent; France fifth, with 4-71 per cent, 
and Spain sixth, with 2*41 per cent. The percentage of the world’s 
tonnage belonging to Mexico, Central and South America is, all told, less 
than one-fiftieth of the whole (1*7 percent), divided as follows: Mexico, 
0*04 per cent; Bolivia, 0*01 percent; Brazil, 0-67 percent; Argentine, 
0*19 per cent; Chile, 0-64 per cent; Peru, 0*04 per cent; Uruguay, 0*05 
per cent; Venezuela, 0-01 per cent; and the remaining countries so 
small as to be unnecessary to note. 

These facts are well summed up by the Commissioner of Navigation 
in his annual report of 1890 in the following table, giving the number 
and tonnage of steamers of over one hundred tons gross, and of sailing 


'52-31 per cent. See tables, Lloyd’s Register Book, 1889. 



NICARAGUA CANAL. 


13 


vessels of one hundred tons net and upwards, belonging to the eight 
leading countries of the world: 


A 



Per cent- 
age of 
total 
tonnage. 

Steam. 

Sail. 

Steam and sail. 

Flag. 

Number. 

Gross 

tonnage. 

Number. 

Net 

tonnage. 

Total ! 
number, j 

Total 

tonnage. 

British United Kingdom. 
Colonies. 

46 *23 
6-11 

5,574 
829 ! 

7, 744, 644 
461,210 

3,593 
2, 075 

2,467,212 

894,040 

9,167 

2,904 

10,241,856 
1, 355, 250 

Total. 

52 '34 

6,403 | 

8, 205,854 

5,668 

3,361,252 

12,071 | 

11, 597.106 

American. 

8-22 

416 

517. 394 

2, 856 

1,306, 488 

3,272 

1, 823, 882 

NorM r egian. 

7'17 

395 

246, 669 

\ 2,974 

1, 337, 686 

3,369 1 

1,584,355 

German. 

7-07 

741 

928, 911 

1,135 

640, 400 

1,876 ; 

T,569, 311 

French . 

4-71 

526 

809, 598 

854 

235, 504 

1.380 

1, 045,102 

Spanish. 

2-41 

389 

414, 817 

494 

119, 994 

883 

534,811 

Dutch. 

1*79 

162 

217, 022 

382 

161, 762 

544 

378,784 

Danish. 

1-26 

217 

159,072 

591 

120, 993 

808 

280, 065 


In other words, the Hags of the great nations of Europe float over 
nearly nine-tenths of the sea going tonnage of the world, while those 
of the countries of this continent cover something less than one-tenth. 
If these figures alone are considered, it should seem that our claim to 
paramount commercial interest is little more than a boast; and that 
Europe, or even Great Britain alone, has a greater interest in the 
Nicaragua canal, or in any other ocean communication of the globe, 
than have the United States and all the other nations of America 
combined. But the mere tonnage of vessels belonging to different 
countries is not the only factor to be considered. 

For instance, many of the English ships whose tonnage goes to 
swell the total are engaged in coasting trade, or in commerce with 
European and African ports, and would never enter the canal at all, 
while nearly all of our own coasters as well as many of our foreign 
traders would use it constantly. Again, if we compare the values of 
foreign commerce ( i . e ., the general imports and exports of merchan¬ 
dise) of the leading commercial nations of the world, we find the 
annual average of the general imports and exports combined for the 
ten years, 1880-’90, valued in dollars: 


United Kingdom 

Germany. 

France . 

United States 
Spain —. 


$3, 364, 546,665 
2, 216, 804, 654 
1, 914, 474, 639 
1, 465, 805, 561 
298,588, 700 


Which shows the United States to have held fourth place in the 
world’s commerce during the past decade, but with a commerce on the 
part of the United Kingdom less than two and a half times our own, 
instead of five times, as was the case of the relative tonnage of the two 
countries. Beside this is the fact that the percentage of increase in (he 
yearly average for these ten years over the yearly average for the years 
1871-1880, shows for the United Kingdom, 6-50 ; for Germany, 10-29 ; 
for France, 6*48 ; for the United States, 26*15 ; for Spain, 52*80 ; which 
indicates that the commerce of the United States with the world is grow¬ 
ing more rapidly than that of any of the countries given, except Spain ; 
and that the United States has increased her trade nearly four times as 
rapidly as has the United Kingdom or France, and about two and one- 
half times as rapidly as Germany, while Spain shows a still more remark¬ 
able increase. 


































14 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


It is evident, then, should this growth continue, that the United 
States will not long find it profitable to remain without a larger mer¬ 
chant marine, or to leave her carrying trade to other nations. It is 
clear also that figures based upon the world’s tonnage of to-day" are a 
most untrustworthy guide to the conditions that will exist when a 
canal across the isthmus is completed. Such a canal will, of necessity, 
increase the trade of the United States between the Atlantic and 
Pacific ports, as well as the trade of these ports with Central and 
South America, vtith Mexico, and, only to a less degree, with other 
countries of the world. Our possessions on the Pacific coast are, 
indeed, as Mr. Blaine said in 1881: 

Imperial in extent and of extraordinary growth. Even at their present stage of 
development they would supply the larger part of the traffic which would seek the 
advantages of the canal. The states and territories appurtenant to the Pacific 
Ocean and dependent upon it for commercial outlet, and hence directly interested 
in the canal, comprise an area of nearly eight hundred thousand square miles, 
larger in extent than the German Empire and the four Latin countries of Europe 
combined. 

These and similar considerations no doubt justify the claims of the 
United States to a greater commercial interest in the canal than that 
of any other nation in the world, and no one who does not believe 
that this country is going to sink to commercial insignificance amongst 
nations, can doubt that the day will come, and come quickly, when we 
shall wrest from England a part of her carrying trade upon the ocean, 
and shall take our rightful place amongst the trading countries of the 
world—perhaps the first. 

But great as is the commercial importance to the United States of a 
canal across Nicaragua, its relations to her defense and to her safety as a 
nation are far more considerable. 

The commercial valut^of the waterway is at least shared by the world; 
but the strategic value, so far as it relates to home defense, concerns 
only the nations of the western continent; and of these virtually the 
United States alone as the one power which has, or is likely to have, 
ships that can use it. 

There can be no excuse for a failure on the part of this Government 
to realize the great military value of the canal to the defense of the 
coasts of the United States, for it was announced by a President, Mr. 
Hayes, in his message to Congress, March 8, 1880, in words that are 
worthy the attention of every American: 

An interoceanic canal across the American isthmus will essentially change the 
geographical relations between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States, 
and between the United States and the rest of the world. It will be the great ocean 
thoroughfare between our Atlantic and Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the 
(•oast line of the United States. Our merely commercial interest in it is greater than 
that of all other countries, while its relation to our power and prosperity as a nation, 
to our means of defense, our unity, peace, and safety, are matters of paramount con¬ 
cern to the people of the United States. 

The message of the President, as well as subsequent letter of various 
Secretaries of State to our ministers abroad and especially the minister 
to England, was directed chiefly against the vexatious Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty, under color of which Great Britain assumes, as she may here¬ 
after assume, to interfere in the political control of an American canal. 

This treaty, since its ratification in 1850, has been a source of inter¬ 
mittent irritation between the United States and Great Britain. Unfor¬ 
tunately it has never been abrogated, an attempt to do so soon after 
its ratification having failed. Although the treaty still exists it has 
come to be looked upon by the United States as practically void. This 


NICAHAUGA CANAL. 


15 


is shown by the speech of Mr. Sherman in the Senate of the United 
States, January 10, 1801, in the course of which he says: u We think 
it can be justly affirmed that the convention of 1850 has become 
obsolete,” for reasons then set forth in detail. He adds: 

In view of all these considerations, the committee, is of opinion that the United 
States is at present under no obligations, measured either by the terms of the con¬ 
vention, the principles of public law, or good morals, to refrain from promoting, in 
any way that it may seem best for its just interests, the construction of this canal, 
without regard to anything contained in the convention of 1850. 

But by England, whenever it suits the exigencies of any current 
policy, this treaty is still held to be in force; for the very natural rea¬ 
son, from an English point of view, that the clauses disadvantageous 
to that country have from their very nature been long since carried 
into effect, and that the conditions which led to the formulation of the 
treaty can never again obtain on this continent. English statesmen, 
therefore, not unnaturally insist that the return obligations limiting 
the power of the United States in Central America, and especially 
limiting American control of a canal built at Nicaragua, shall remain 
in effect, as well as the clauses giving to England certain rights of 
guarantee to which her geographical position does not entitle her, 
and which she would not concede to any nation if she was the domi¬ 
nant power in America. 

The truth of the words of Mr. Hayes, above quoted, ought to be 
evident to us all, but it is probable that the apathy with which we, as 
a nation, look upon all matters relating to our own safety, will prevent 
this aspect of the Nicaragua canal from being considered. We have 
fought the great war of modern times, we have had millions of men 
under arms in the held, our military power on land is without limit, 
therefore we are unconquerable—such is the seasoning. But we forget 
that the United States is by nature and by neglect one of the most 
vulnerable nations of the world, and that no great power has so vast 
an extent of frontier exposed to the attack of an enemy. 

The Atlantic seaboard, from Quoddy Head, Maine, to Cape Florida, 
is 2,043 statute miles; the Gulf coast from Cape Florida to the Bio 
Grande is 1,852 miles; while the Pacific coast line from the Mexican 
boundary to the Straits of Fuca and including the Straits of Bace Bock 
Lights is 1,810 miles.* 

Along the Atlantic coast are scattered thirty-two cities each of over 
eight thousand inhabitants, cities which are directly exposed to bom¬ 
bardment from hostile ships; without considering the hundreds of 
others that could be attacked by light draught boats, or reached by 
land attack directed from shipping; or, still others of smaller popula¬ 
tion but containing considerable wealth. Along the Gulf coast there 
are five cities each of over eight thousand people directly exposed to 
bombardment from the water, while on the Pacific there are four. 

Besides these places, so temptingly inviting destruction, there are, 
of course, along this long line of coast, scores of bays and inlets that 
would furnish a safe shelter for an enemy’s ships operating against us. 


*1 owe these figures to the courtesy of the superintendent of the Coast and 
Geodetic Survey, Prof. Mendenhall, by whom the following additional figures are 
given: The line of the coast of Alaska from the Portland canal, including the 
Aleutian Islands, Behring Sea, and the Arctic Ocean to the 141st meridian, is 4,750 
statute miles. Including the indentations along the coasts to the head of tide water 
the lengths are, for the Atlantic coast, 36,607 statute miles; for the Gulf coast, 19,293 
miles; and for Alaska, 26,376 miles; total, 82,276 miles. 



16 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


On all our coast line we have land defenses at only thirty-two* points, 
and those are in most cases old, obsolete, and so weak in armament as 
to be hardly worth taking into account. 

These old and well-known truths would hardly be worth statement 
here were it not for the fact that they bear directly upon the military 
aspect of the canal and that they will probably remain unchanged for 
many years to come, for the United States moves slowly in these 
matters. But even were it otherwise and were the greatest efforts 
made by the Government to protect our seacoast by land defenses, 
such defenses could and would be placed only at the principal harbors, 
and the general protection of our coasts against foreign attack be 
necessarily left to the Navy. 

Without accepting for a moment the sweeping statement advanced 
by the Navy t that u If a navy is made thoroughly competent for its 
work no other defense for a coast will be called into play, and if it is 
incompetent no other defense can prevent a disaster to the coast,” it is 
evident that the defense of such a great length of coast as our own, 
marked throughout with excellent harbors and thriving cities, must 
be lelt mainly to the floating defenses. Land works can not be built at 
all the vulnerable points. Even to protect by floating batteries this 
line of coast would require an enormous number of ships. Here we are 
confronted by probable rather than by desirable conditions, and in con¬ 
sidering a conflict with a great European power must look upon our 
naval defenses from the point of view of the numerically weaker. At 
present we have a navy of which we, as a nation, are learning to be 
proud; a navy gaining constantly in the regard of the world, and one 
that will receive, in future, the aid and encouragement necessary to 
place it, ship for ship, abreast, perhaps ahead, of any navy of the 
world. 

But there can be no doubt that the United States will never wish, as 
she shall never need, to rival in peace the great military establishments 
of Europe, either on sea or on land. Her policy will be to maintain for 
the purposes of national defense a small, but perfectly disciplined, 
armed, and equipped force on land; and on the ocean a small fleet of 
swift and powerful ships which shall carry her flag with honor upon 
every sea. 

It is true that we have risen, as a naval power, from the regretable 
position of nineteenth, which we held in 1886, with only Peru and Mex¬ 
ico below us, and such countries as China, Turkey,Greece, and Portugal 
above; but even when the vessels now authorized or building are com¬ 
pleted the United States will rank as a naval power only seventh 
amongst the nations of the world, with Great Britain, France, Italy, 
Bussia, and even Spain above her. 


*The Penobscot and Keuebec rivers, the harbors of Portland, Portsmouth, X. H., 
Boston, and New Bedford, Narragansett Bay; the harbors of New London, New Haven, 
and New York; Delaware River, the harbor of Baltimore, and approaches to Wash¬ 
ington by the Potomac: Hampton Roads, harbor of Beaufort, N. C., north of the 
Cape Fear River, harbors of Charleston and Savannah; Cumberland Sound, harbors 
of St. Augustine, Key West, Dry Tortugas, Pensacola, Mobile, Ship Island; the mouth 
of the Mississippi, and other approaches to New Orleans; the harbor of Galveston, 
the bay of San Diego, and San Francisco, and the mouth of the Columbia. The 
facts stated above in “ Our Sea-coast Defenses,’ 7 by Lieut. Eugene Griffin, Corps of 
Engineers, 1885, have not since materially changed. 

tSee “ The Year’s Naval Progress," 1891. p. 379. The views are those of an 
individual, nevertheless they appear clothed with the authority of the Office of 
Naval Intelligence. 




NICARAGUA CANAL. 


17 


RANK OF THE U. S. NAVY.* 


[House Doc., Fifty-second Congress, second session, Report No. 2489. Appropriations for the 
naval service February 13, 1893.] 


In 1860 the United States ranked 
after the following nations and 
ahead of all the rest: 

In 1886 the United States ranked 
thus: 

Rank of the navies of the world 
when vessels for U. S. Navy 
now authorized or building are 
completed: 

Great Britain. 

Great Britain. 

Great Britain. 

France. 

France. 

France. 

Russia. 

Italy. 

Italy. 

Spain. 

Russia. 

Russia. 

Sweden and Norway. 

Germany. 

Germany. 

United States. 

Spain. 

Spain. 


Austria. 

United States. 


China. 

Austria. 


Japan. 

China. 


Holland. 

Japan. 


Sweden and Norway. 

Holland. 


Turkey. 

Sweden and Norway. 


Denmark. 

Turkey. 


Greece 

Denmark. 


Brazil. 

Greece. 


Argentine. 

Brazil. 


Chile. 

Argentine. 


Portugal. 

Chile. 


United States. 

Portugal. 


Peru. 

Peru. 


Mexico. 

Mexico. 


"There is no mistake more commonly, if thoughtlessly, made in considering our 
new ships than to suppose that we alone are advancing in naval affairs and other 
nations standing still. 


So, no doubt, it will be the fortune of our navy to be always small in 
numbers, but Avith no distant colonies to defend, and with our vessels 
at the alarm of war gathered, so far as may be wise, upon our own 
threatened coasts; we may obtain the preponderance on either seaboard, 
if we have but a short cut across the Isthmus. 30UA8 

The strategic value of the canal in the defense of our coasts thus 
becomes evident at once. The actual saving of distance between New 
York and San Francisco will be about 9,894 miles. From New York to 
San Francisco, via the Nicaragua Canal, the distance is 4,960 miles; 
New Orleans to San Francisco, by canal, 4,047 miles. Thus by means 
of it our fleets could be transferred from the Pacific ports to those 
of the Atlantic with 10,000 miles less steaming than is now the 
case, and the smaller navy concentrated at a point threatened by for¬ 
eign attack probably before the blow could be delivered—an impossi¬ 
bility with 10,000 miles of sea travel along coasts where coal could 
perhaps not be obtained in war, added to the 5,000 miles of steaming 
between New York and San Francisco, necessary even if a canal were 
constructed. 

In short, a canal under United States control will give all the advan¬ 
tage to the defense that is to be derived from maneuvring on inside 
lines; and will, in addition, give the probability of naval stations, and 
the certainty of coaling stations, on the road of ships from the Pacific 
to the Atlantic seaboard. 

One other advantage is perhaps worthy of mention, though it can 
only be called forth in the remote contingency of an invasion of the 
United States, either directly or through a door willingly held open by 
S. Ex. 74-2 









18 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


our neighbors on the north or south. The writer means the concentra¬ 
tion of the navy to repel a landing upon our coasts. 

If invasion were threatened by one of the great powers which, it is 
thought, can'mobilize in a week, and with their fast transports be on 
our shores long before a ship on the California coast could round South 
America, or before a strong protecting fleet coaid, under present con¬ 
ditions, be concentrated on the Pacific, a short cut through Nicaragua 
might save a national disaster. 

Of course, invasion in force of the United States is a most improbable 
event, still were it to happen at all, it might very well come at a time 
when the land forces of the nation were fully occupied, and when the 
attempt could be defeated only by the concentration of the naval 
defenses. 

But besides the great strategic advantage of the canal there would 
be many smaller military advantages given to the United States by the 
waterway, if, during times of war, it is maintained under the control of 
the Government. Such, for instance, would be the transport of very 
heavy ordnance, of torpedoes and bulky material, and of military stores 
and ammunition from the great manufactories of the east, when the 
difference of time between sea and land transit would not be important, 
or when the transcontinental railways are working to their limits. In 
addition, torpedo boats and other small craft; monitors, perhaps, or 
improvised ships; and possibly very heavy coast defense vessels with 
small coal capacity might pass from ocean to ocean through the canal 
when it would be impracticable to send them around South America. 
And lastly, the armed forces of the United States might be transported 
from the Atlantic or Gulf to the Pacific without the aid of the rail¬ 
roads in certain contingencies too remote to make it worth while to dis¬ 
cuss them here. Such will be some of the advantages of the Nicaragua 
Canal to the defense. 

But it often happens that the best defense is the attack, and from 
this point of view a canal will be of exceeding value to the United States. 
Not only will it permit the speedy passage of troop ships to those coun¬ 
tries which have in recent years several times shown their hostility to 
our flag, but it will bring within our reach the merchant shipping of 
Europe which reaps such a rich harvest along the coast of South Amer¬ 
ica from Chile to Panama; and will enable us to strike great commer¬ 
cial interests like those of the nitrate beds, as well as to reach the war - 
ships and land defenses of a western South American state. 

With a power to throw a preponderating force on either seaboard, it 
is evident that the United States may not only defend her own coasts 
effectively, but may be enabled to so concentrate her naval strength as 
to threaten any point north or south on the coast of either ocean or in 
the West Indies, without weakening too greatly her own coast protec¬ 
tion, aud thus divert a large force of hostile ships by the necessity of 
defending such stations as Halifax, Esquimalt, Bermuda, Havana, or 
Jamaica, and of guarding merchant shipping in western waters. 

Of course a canal under American control will divert part of our 
strength for its defense; but considering the position of the waterway, 
forming, as it will virtually, portion of our own coast line, this amounts 
simply to adding one more port to those already existing on each of the 
Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Such ports should strengthen rather than 
weaken the naval defense, since both may be converted by land works 
into strong harbors of refuge and naval bases, or coaling stations which 
w T e greatly need. 

But without further considering the details of the defense, it is evi- 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


19 


dent that with nine-tenths of the worlds tonnage against her, and with 
her small naval strength, any interior lines will he of advantage to the 
United States in defense of her coast. The Nicaragua Canal being such 
a line, should enable the United States to get to the threatened point 
first and with the greatest number of guns 5 or if not quite that, should 
give the best possible chance to concentrate to meet an attack. 

Should the United States ever acquire islands in the Pacific to be 
used actively or passively as naval outposts of defense, as does not 
seem improbable in the light of recent events, the value of a short cut 
across the isthmus will be immensely increased. Referring to this 
aspect of the Nicaragua Canal, First Lieut. L. D. Greene, Seventh U. 
S. Infantry, in his study of the subject says: 

Absorption by us of that small Kingdom (Hawaii) or even a protectorate, will 
involve additional military responsibilities; the latter will become a point of vantage 
to overlook and care for our great commerce along the west coast of both Americas, 
a great naval station for repair and supply of our ships in the Pacific will be estab¬ 
lished, and it must be held with sufficient strength to effectually discourage any 
attempt at capture or destruction by some power strong on the seas. * * * and 

in its holding the value of quick water communication with all ports on our eastern 
seaboard, which would be ensured by the possession of the Nicaragua Canal, saving 
as it would over one-half the present water distance, is a factor too apparent to 
need argument. ^ 

Lieut. Greene further says: 

The moral effect of this military readiness to hold our own can scarcely be over- 
stimated. Occupying a position in Central America which is practically impreg¬ 
nable to foreign attack, and from which as a base our modern Navy can act on either 
the Atlantic or Pacific, dominating on one hand the gulf, and its commerce to our 
country, Mexico and the West Indies, with its agglomeration of natural interests; 
* * * On the other hand with the support of the stations that may be established 

in Hawaii and among the Gallapagos islands, we would hold in complete control the 
ocean highlands of the Pacific. 

But to secure the great defensive advantage given by her natural 
position, it is evident that the canal must be something more than a 
neutral waterway. It must be open at all times either of peace or war 
to the ships of the United States and closed to those of her enemies. 
In other words, the Nicaragua Canal, in its military aspect, must be “ A 
canal under American control.” 

The conclusions which would appear logically to flow from the nat¬ 
ural conditions that it has been the writer’s endeavor to outline, have 
long ago been reached by this Gover nment, and the policy of the United 
States has been clearly announced in regard to any waterway that may 
be constructed across the American Isthmus. 

In words as simple and perhaps as weighty as those by which Mr. 
Monroe had, sixty years before, caused the nations of Europe to halt 
in their interference with the political affairs of this continent, Mr. 
Hayes in his message to Congress of March 8, 1880 , already in part 
quoted, said: 

The policy of this country is a canal under American control. The United States 
can not consent to the surrender of this control to any European power, or to any 
combination of European powers. If existing treaties between the United States 
and other nations or if the rights of sovereignty or property of other nations stand 
in the way of this policy—a contingency which is not apprehended—suitable steps 
should be taken by just and liberal negotiations to promote and establish the Amer¬ 
ican policy on this subject, consistently with the rights of the nations to be affected 
by it. 

The capital invested by corporations or citizens of other countries in such an enter¬ 
prise must, in a degree, look for protection to one or more of the great powers of the 
world. No European power can intervene for such protection, without adopting 
measures on this continent which the United States would deem wholly inadmissible. 
If the protection of the United States is relied upon, the United States must exer¬ 
cise such control as will enable this country to protect its national interests and 
maintain the rights of those whose private capital is embarked in the work. 


20 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


In these words, perhaps, lie the germs of a doctrine as far-reaching 
and as important to the world as was the equally simple announcement 
of that other doctrine, which Mr. Frelinghuysen says 

Has since remained a cardinal principle of our continental policy, (and ) in several 
notable instances, especially in the case of the French attempt to set up imperial 
authority in Mexico, it guided our political action, and it is to-day firmly imbedded 
in the American heart. 

The message of Mr. Hayes announced our policy at a time when 
European projects at Panama threatened serious complications with 
the United States over the question of the guaranty of the neutrality 
of the waterway and isthmus. Though it seems to have passed away 
with the occasion that called it forth, it may yet become a part of our 
national faith, and may grow in time into a great national principle 
that shall govern the policy of the United States in regard to any canal 
that may be constructed across America. 

But the bare announcement of a principle, unsupported by the 
statesmen of the day and unexplained in its scope and meaning, may 
fall far short of an utterance that will fix the policy of the nation, even 
if the author be a President of the United States. The words of Mr. 
Hayes could not now be looked upon as determining the attitude of the 
country toward an isthmian canal if they stand alone. But such is not 
the case. The doctrine of a canal under American control, fore¬ 
shadowed by General Grant, affirmed by Mr. Hayes, and reaffirmed by 
his successors, has been emphasized by statesmen and elaborated by 
secretaries of the United States, until it should seem that this principle 
too must have become u firmly embedded in the American heart.” 

Chief amongst those who have emphasized this policy stands Mr.. 
Blaine, who as Secretary of State wrote to Mr. Lowell, then ( 1881 ) 
minister to England, a series of letters defining the position of the 
United States in regard to an American canal. 

Mr. Blaine says: 

“In 1846 a memorable and important treaty was negotiated and signed between 
tbe United States of America and the republic of New Granada, the now United 
States of Colombia. By the thirty-fifth article of that treaty, in exchange for certain 
concessions made by the United States we guaranteed positively and efficaciously the 
perfect neutrality of the isthmus and of any interoceanic communication that might 
be constructed upon or over it for the maintenance of free transit from sea to sea, 
and we also guaranteed the rights of sovereignty and property of the United States 
of Colombia over the territory of the isthmus as included within the borders of th& 
Straits of Panama. In the judgment of the President (Mr. Garfield) this guaranty 
given by the United States of America does not require reinforcement or accession 
or assent from any other power. In more than one instance this Government has 
been called upon to vindicate the neutrality thus guaranteed, and there is no con^ 
tingency now seen or apprehended in which such vindication would not be within 
the power of the nation. 

There has never been the slightest doubt on the part of the United States as to 
the purpose or extent of the obligation for which it became surety alike for the free 
transit of the world’s commerce over whatever landway or waterway might be 
opene d from sea to sea, and for the territorial rights of Colombia from aggression 
or interference of any kind, nor has there been room to question the full extent of 
the advantages and benefits naturally due to its geographical position and polit¬ 
ical relations in the western continent which the United States obtained from 
the owners of the isthmian territory for that far reaching and responsible guar¬ 
anty. * * * 

It is not the wish or the purpose pf the United States to interfere with any com¬ 
mercial enterprise in which the citizens or subjects of any foreign power may see fit 
to embark under a lawful privilege. The fact of the stock and franchise of the Pan¬ 
ama Canal or the Panama Railroad being owned in Europe, either in whole or prin¬ 
cipally, is no more a subject of complaint on the part of the United States than is the 
circumstance that the stock of many of its own great lines of railway is largely held 
abroad. Such ownership with its attached rights is in the United States amply se¬ 
cured by the laws of the land, and on the isthmus is doubly secured by the local 
laws of Colombia under the superior guaranty of the United States. 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


21 


Nor in the time of peace does the United States seek to have any exclusive privi¬ 
leges accorded to American ships in respect to precedence or tolls through an inter- 
oceanic canal any more than it has sought like privileges for American goods in 
transit over the Panama Railroad under the exclusive control of an American corpora¬ 
tion. The extent of privileges of American citizens and ships is measurable, under 
the treaty of 1846, by those of Colombian citizens and ships. It would be our earnest 
desire and expectation to see the world's peaceful commerce enjoy the same quiet, 
liberal, and rational treatment. 

It is as regards the ymlitical control of such a canal, as distinguished from its 
merely administrative or commercial relations, that the President (Mr. Garfield) 
feels called upon to speak with directness and with emphasis. During any war to 
which the United States of America or the United States of Colombia might be a 
party, the passage of armed vessels of a hostile nation through the canal of Panama 
would be no more admissible than would the passage of the armed forces of a hostile 
nation over the railroad lines joining the Atlantic and Pacific shores of the United 
States or of Colombia. And the United States will insist upon her rights to take all need¬ 
ful precautions against the possibility of the isthmus transit being in any event used offens¬ 
ively against her interests upon the land or upon the sea. * * * 

The policy of the United States is one of peace and friendly intercourse with every 
government and people. A disposition is practically avowed, and is, moreover, 
abundantly shown in the fact that our armament by land and sea are kept within 
such limits as to afford no grounds for distrust or suspicion of menace to other 
nations. 

The guaranty entered into by this Government in 1846 was manifestly in the 
interests of peace, and the necessity imposed by circumstances upon the United 
States of America to watch over a highway between its coasts was so imperative 
that the resultant guaranty was the simplest justice to the chief interests concerned. 

Any attempt to supersede that guaranty by an agreement between European powers, 
which maintained vast armies and patrolled the seas with immense fleets, and whose interest 
in the canal and its operations can never be so vital and supreme as ours, would partake 
of the nature of an alliance against the United States, and would be regarded by this 
Government as an indication of an unfriendly feeling. * * 

A consideration of the controlling influence in this question is the well-settled 
conviction on the part of this Government that only by the United States exercising 
supervision can the isthmus canal be definitely and at all times secured against the 
interference and obstructions incident to war. A netv agreement of neutrality on 
paper between the great powers of Europe m ight prove ineffectual to preserve the canal in 
time of hostilities. The first sound of a cannon in a general European war would in all 
probability annul the treaty of neutrality, and the strategic position of the canal 
commanding both oceans might be held by the first naval power that could seize it. 
If this should be done, the United States would suffer such grave inconvenience and 
loss in the domestic commerce as would enforce the duty of a defensive and pro¬ 
tracted war on her part for the mere purpose of gaining that control which, in 
advance, she insists is due to her position and demanded by her necessities. 

I am not arguing or assuming that a general war, or any war at all, is imminent 
in Europe. But it must not be forgotten that within the past twenty-five years all 
the great powers have been engaged in war, most of them more than once. In only a 
single instance in the past hundred years has the United States exchanged a hostile 
shot with any European power. It is in the highest degree improbable that for a 
hundred years to come even that experience will be repeated. 

It consequently becomes evident that the one conclusion made of procuring any isthmus 
canal from the possible distraction and destruction of tear is to place it under the control 
of that Government least likely to be engaged in tear and able in any and every event to 
enforce the guardianship which she shall assume. * * * 

Between the United States and the other American Republics there can be no 
hostility, no jealousy, no rivalry, no distrust. This Government entertains no 
design in connection with this project for its own advantage which is not also for 
the equal or greater advantage of the country to be directly or indirectly aflected. 
Nor does the United States seek any exclusive or narrow commercial advantage. 
It frankly agreed and will by public proclamation declare at the proper time in 
■conjunction with the Republic on whose soil the canal may be located, that the 
same rights and privileges, the same tolls and obligations for the use of the canal 
shall apply with absolute impartiality to the merchant marine of every nation on 
the globe. And equally in time of peace the harmless use of the canal shall be 
freely granted to the war vessels of other nations. In time of war, aside from the 
defensive use to be made of it by the country in which it is constructed, and by the United 
States, the canal shall be impartially closed against the war vessels of all belligerents. 

It is the desire and the determination of the United States that the canal shall be 
used only for the development of peaceful commerce of all nations, and shall not be 
considered a stragetic point in warfare which may tempt the aggression of belliger- 


22 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


ents or be seized under the compulsion of military necessity by any of the great 
powers that may have contests in which the United States has no stake and will take 
no part. For self-protection to her own interests, therefore, the United States in the first 
instance asserts her right to control the isthmus transit. And, secondly, she offers by such 
control that absolute neutralization of the canal as respects European powers ivhich can in 
no other way be certainly attained and lastingly assured. 

Such was the attitude assumed by the United States towards a canal 
across the American isthmus at a time when it seemed probable that 
the French Company, under concessions from the United States of 
Colombia, was on the verge of successfully solving the problem at 
Panama. 

It is not to be doubted that the vigorous utterances of our Govern¬ 
ment not only expressed the sentiments of the people of the United 
States at that time, but we may well believe these utterances will out¬ 



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line the future policy of the United States towards any waterway across 
America. 

It is true, as has been said, that this definition of policy was called 
forth by events that have now ceased from troubling, and by conditions 
that no longer have place in international affairs. Nevertheless, sim¬ 
ilar conditions will again arise and must be met by this Government. 
When this time comes it is to be hoped that the principles announced 
will not be forgotten. They can never be disregarded with safety by 
the United States, for they are as lasting as the very hills that stand 
between the oceans. 

It would thus seem that the policy of the United States in regard to 
any waterway across the isthmus has been indicated by nature and 






























NICARAGUA CANAL. 23 

defined by government. It will be a canal under American control 
alone. 

This policy implies the intention on the part of the United States to 
enforce that control. But before proceeding to the consideration of 
the best manner of doing this, it becomes necessary to outline the 
conditions surrounding the canal and the characteristics of the water 
way itself. 

As every one knows, the Nicaragua Canal lies within the limits of 
two sovereign states, and is being built under a concession from both. 

From Greytown to Ochoa it is wholly within Nicaraguan territory; 
hence, to the lake, it follows the San Juan Biver, which is the boundary 
line between Nicaragua and Costa Bica, to within three miles of 
Castillo Viejo; from this point westward the canal again lies wholly 
within Nicaragua. 

The Kepublic of Nicaragua is in area the largest of the Central 
American States; but its population is only about 312,000, of whom at 
least 30,000 are uncivilized Indians. 

Bounded east and west by the ocean, south by the great forests of 
Costa Bica, and north by the plains and forests of Honduras, Nicaragua 
is hardly more than a vast wilderness inclosed by wastes of water and 
land little used by man. The country is for the most part covered by 
dense forests, which, however, grow more open on the drier Pacific 
slopes, and toward the northeast give place to vast savannas almost 
wholly unoccupied except by Indians and by wild cattle, sprung, it is 
said, from stock brought long ago from Jamaica and other West India 
islands. 

Along the west coast a ridge of mountains follows closely the sea, 
while the immediate coast on the east is low and covered usually by 
jungle and swamp. In this region, and especially in the vicinity of 
Blewfields, lie the great banana plantations as well as the sections 
which produce most of the rubber, mahogany, and other valuable 
woods for which Nicaragua is celebrated. The mountain regions of 
Ghontales are rich in minerals, while west and south of the Lake of 
Nicaragua, in the districts of Bivas and Granada, lie the more valuable 
cacao and coffee plantations of the country; here sugar is abundant. 
Another valuable coffee district is growing up in the department of 
Matagalpa, north of the lakes; while between these and on the northern 
and western shores large herds of cattle are raised. Indeed the rail¬ 
roads from Granada to Managua, and especially from Momotombo to 
Corinto, pass through a fine, well cultivated region producing many 
cattle, whose hides form one of the chief exports of the country. 

The cultivated and more civilized portion^ of Nicaragua lie for the 
most part in the comparatively small area inclosed between the Pacific 
and a line drawn from Corinto, through Cliinandegua and Leon, to the 
Lake of Managua, thence to the capital, Managua, Masaya, Granada 
to San Jorge. Bivas, and San Juan del Sur. Here live the more 
civilized of the people, and here are placed the larger estates which 
produce the greater portion of the wealth of the country. From the 
ports of Corinto and San Juan are shipped all, or nearly all, of the 
coffee, hides, and cacao, which, with the rubber and bananas of the 
east coast, constitute the chief exports of the country. 

The chief cities are all situated in the region outlined. They are, Leon, 
with about 25,000 inhabitants; Managua, with 18,000; Granada, with 
15,000; Cliinandegua, 12,500; Masaya, 10,000; Bivas, 8,000. These, 
with Greytown, which has about 2,000, and perhaps Bluefields, in the 
Mosquito Territory, comprise the main settlements. On the Atlantic 


24 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


coast Greytown is tlie only port of consequence. Bluefields, it is true, 
is a large shipping port for fruits, but for little else, and besides it is so 
isolated as hardly to form a part of the country. 

Nicaragua has but two ports on the Pacific, Corinto and San Juan 
del Sur; the former a small, hot, dirty, sandy town, lying, however, on 
a fine harbor 5 the latter a hamlet placed at the foot of a hill overlook¬ 
ing an open roadstead unworthy to be called a harbor. Here lands 
the northern cable on its way from La Libertad, Salvador, to Panama. 
From San Juan telegraph land lines extend to the chief cities, and 
eastward to Greytown. 

With the exception of the railroad built and owned by the Canal 
Company, there are but two railroads in Nicaragua, though several 
others are projected. The lines constructed are from Corinto to Mom- 
otombo, 58 miles, and from Managua to Granada, 32 miles. A line is 
projected from San Juan del Sur via Rivas to San Jorge on the Lake 
of Nicaragua; also from Chinandegua to El Viejo, and from Matagalpa 
to Lake Managua. Concessions have also been given for a line from 
Lake of Nicaragua to Eama on the Bluefields River, and from Mata¬ 
galpa to the east coast, but these are far in the future. 

O 11 the Lake of Managua are several good steamers, mostly of Eng¬ 
lish build, but on the Lake of Nicaragua but one steamer worth notice 
is found; she belongs to the canal company, which also owns several 
small river boats, the remains of the old transportation company’s 
line. The waterway between the lakes of Managua and Nicaragua is 
not navigable, but part of the agreement of the Vanal company is to 
build a canal between these lakes. Roads are few and bad. 

In government, Nicaragua is a Republic whose chief magistrate is 
elected by the people for a term of four years. He is assisted by a 
cabinet appointed by himself and composed of a minister of foreign 
affairs and public instruction; war, police and marine; government, 
justice, and ecclesiastical affairs; finance and public credit; and 
public works. 

The legislative power is vested in a Congress of two houses, a sen¬ 
ate and house of representatives, elected by universal suffrage. The 
Congress meets every two years. The judicial power is vested in a 
supreme court and other tribunals. 

There are said to be 1,200 soldiers in the regular army, and 5,000 
belonging to the militia or reserves,* but these numbers are very un¬ 
certain, and depend upon the political condition of the country, and 
either for defense or offense the Nicaragua army is worthless—except, 
perhaps, against the unarmed natives. The soldiers are dirty, undis¬ 
ciplined, ill clad, and come from the lowest elements of the population 
amongst whom Indian blood largely prevails. Their equipment is 
poor, their weapons usually old aud rusty, and their ammunition, 
which deteriorates rapidly in the moist, hot climate, soon becomes 
worthless, if it is not so when sold to their Government. Cavalry 
there is none; while of field artillery they have only a few pieces, which 
they can not use and for which they have no horses. They have no 
heavy artillery whatever, except, perhaps, a piece or two at Corinto, a 
few old Spanish guns at Granada and San Carlos, and two or three old 
American cast-iron cannon at Castillo. The officers are, for their class, 
worse than the men. They are ignorant and slouchy, and rarely seem 
to possess a uniform throughout. In short, Nicaragua has no army 
and has neither the means nor the material for creating one. 


* Before tlie revolution of May, 1803. Vide “ Handbook of American Republics.” 



NICARAGUA CANAL. 


25 


It does not need the lessons of the recent revolution to prove that 
even against an outbreak of her own people the army, such as it is, is 
inefficient, and the story of Walker and his followers shows how help¬ 
less these people—whether soldier or civilian—are against the attack 
of the northern race. Even against their neighbors of Costa Eica tli^ 
are weak, and there is not a country of Central America, except, pos¬ 
sibly, Honduras, against which Nicaragua can now hold her own. The 
military weakness of the country, and especially of the army, is an 
important factor in the defense of a canal. Neither Nicaragua nor 
Costa Eica can be relied upon to furnish police protection. 

Nicaragua, then, as a civilized state is contained in the small area 
outlined above; but even here civilization exists only in its crudest 
form. With the exception of Honduras, Nicaragua is the most back¬ 
ward of all the countries lying between the Eio Grande and Panama. 
Like most Spanish-American states, it is a republic only in name; the 
elections are manipulated by the people in power and the President is 
absolute until one stronger than lie comes to take the reins from his 
hands. Great parties divided upon questions of national importance 
do not exist, and politics are simply struggles between rival factions. 
Granada is the residence of the majority of the great families, and the 
clique of influential men there has had perhaps the greatest influence 
in the affairs of the country. To these families are opposed others of 
Leon and Managua. Hence control in Nicaraguan politics is a ques¬ 
tion between individuals. 

The individual Nicaraguan differs somewhat from the other Central 
Americans. He is less bold and truculent than the Salvadorian; 
less civilized than the Costa Rican and with a greater admixture of 
Indian blood. .The Nicaraguan appears of a docile type, easily led. 
He is very idle, dreads all change, and especially fears that northern, 
activity which threatens to invade his country and to put an end to the 
aimless life which alone is suited to his nature. 

This fear exists in many of the Spanish-American countries, at least 
in those lying between the Eio Grande and Panama, and has, it would 
seem, been one of the causes of indifference, even hostility, displayed 
towards American projects by people who, while they understand well 
the material improvement such projects would bring to tlieir country, 
yet resist them. In spite of what our newspapers may say, in Nicara¬ 
gua the indifference to the canal has amounted at times to actual hos¬ 
tility, and that on the part of the better class, whose opposition and 
opinion alone are worth considering. This opposition is by no means 
due to an ignorance that does not perceive the advantage of a world’s 
waterway through Nicaraguan territory, but to the inertia of the people 
and largely to the fear that with the introduction of Americans and 
American ideas will begin an era of progress, competition, and struggle 
for wealth, in which the Nicaraguan is not fitted by nature or habit to 
eugage, and in the course of which he must fall into the condition of an 
inferior being in his own land. 

Costa Eica is a far more civilized country than Nicaragua; indeed it 
is the most advanced of any of the republics from Mexico to Panama. 
Its people, largely descended from European immigrants, are intelli¬ 
gent, industrious, and, for Spanish-Americans, enterprising. 

Large amounts of foreign capital are invested in railroads, land and 
harbor improvements, and in the applications of electricity. The 
Government is perhaps not more stable than those of other Central 
American governments, but changes are less violent and property more 
secure. 


26 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


Although the canal touches the borders of Costa Rica, it is at the 
wilder and less inhabited parts. South of the portion of the San Juan, 
that forms the boundary between this country and Nicaragua, the 
inhabitants are almpst entirely races of Indians, such as the Guatusos 
(Babbit Indians), who are amongst the most degraded of the native- 
tribes of America. But these Indians are a harmless people, living 
chiefly upon flsli and bananas, and from them little harm is to be antici¬ 
pated. 

Any outbreak or revolution in Costa Rica would therefore be far 
from the canal line and separated by wildernesses so vast that no attack 
would be projected against the canal. It is true that a railroad is in 
prospect from the settled portions of the country which lie in the east 
and west belt extending from Puntarenas to Limon; but this road is 
far in the future and will pass through a wilderness. 

No harm to the canal is to be anticipated from Costa Rica, and it is- 
hardly too much to say that no police precautions need be taken against 
her people'; except, of course, in the event of war between Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua, in which case the line would have to be well guarded, 
especially in the west. 

The boundary line between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, defined by the 
Treaty of Limits of 1858, whose provisions were interpreted by the Presi¬ 
dent of the United States, Mr. Cleveland, March, 1888, as arbitrator 
between the two countries, is as follows: 

The dividing line, starting from the Atlantic, shall begin at the extremity of Pun 
a de Castilla, at the mouth of the San Juan River, and shall continue following the 
right bank of that river to a point situated in the water below the castle and 3 
miles from the fortifications. From that point there shall be a curve whose center 
shall be the same fortifications, and said curve shall be always 3 miles distant as far 
as the other point on the water above the castle and 2 miles from the bauk of the 
river. From that point on the dividing point shall continue parallel to the turns 
of the river and to the southern shore of the lake, always 2 miles distant, until it 
shall meet the river Sapoa. From the point where it shall meet the Sapoa, a point 
well understood to be 2 miles from the lake, shall be traced an astronomical line 
as far as the center of the bay of Salinas, in the Pacific, where shall terminate the 
dividing line of the two republics here stipulating. 

The Nicaragua Canal, starting from Greytown and skirting Costa 
Rica, passes through the territory of Nicaragua. From Greytown to 
the northward extends the unhealthy jungle-covered coast of the Mos¬ 
quito Territory, Honduras, Guatemala, the English dependency of 
Belize, Yucatan, and Mexico. In all this long line of coast, indeed as 
far as the Rio Grande, there are hardly more than half a dozen inhab¬ 
ited places worthy to be called towns. Beyond the mouth of the Rio 
Grande lie the settlements of our own country, growing rapidly in size 
and importance. Of these New Orleans, some 1,300 miles distant from 
Greytown, is the most important commercially in regard to the canal, 
while Pensacola and Tampa, the southern termini of great north-and- 
south lines of railroad, are strategically invaluable. Our outposts in 
the Gulf, Key West, and Tortugas stretch southward to within some¬ 
thing like 1,000 miles of the northern outlet of the canal, and lie almost 
on the same meridian with it. 

South of these, and thrust like a wedge between our gulf frontier 
and the canal, lies Cuba, which, in the possession of a country more 
actively hostile to the United States than Spain, might become a dan¬ 
gerous threat to our interests in Central America. 

Eastward’ again of Cuba lie Ilayti and Santo Domingo, neither of 
importance in connection with our present subject; while eastward 
again lies the Spanish island of Porto Rico, flanked by the Virgin 
Group that belongs in part to Denmark, in part to England, and of 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


27 


which the chief islands are Virgin Gorda, Tortola, St. John, St. Croix, 
and St. Thomas, the most important and the seat of the government 
of the Danish West Indies. 

Southeast of this group extend the Windward Islands, beginning with 
the English colonies of Sombrero, Anguilla, and neighboring islets, 
and extending by St. Martin, part of which is French, part Dutch, 
and the French island of St. Bartholomew to the Dutch possession of 
Suba and St. Eustatius, and the pleasant English colonies of St. Kitts 
and Nevis, and the islet of Redon da. 

Thence extend the English islands of Montserratt and Barbuda, the 
latter attached to the presidency of Antigua, which is also an English 
colony. 

South of Antigua lie the French colonies of Guadeloupe and Desi- 
rade, the neighboring islet of Petite Terre, the islands of Marie 
Galante and Les Saintes, which are under the government of Guade¬ 
loupe. Then come Aves Islet and Dominica, which for a hundred 
years has been a British possession. South of this lies Martinique, 
settled by the French two hundred and fifty years ago and still a 
French colony; while south again lie the Windward Islands proper, 
consisting of the English possessions of St. Lucia, St. Vincent, the 
Grenadines, Grenada, and Barbadoes, which was in the possession of 
England before the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth. Then follow Tobago 
and Trinidad, both English. These complete the chain which extends 
from Cuba and the Bahamas to the Spanish Main. 

Westward along the coast of the continent from Trinidad lie the 
republics of Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica, the last extending 
in its turn to the mouth of the river San Juan. 

Such are the boundaries of the great inland sea of America, from 
which the Nicaragua Canal leads westward. Like the Mediterranean 
it is partly landlocked and surrounded by regions of great fertility; 
it is placed on that central belt of commerce that now finds a water¬ 
way around the world, except at the barrier of the American Isthmus; 
it contains magnificent harbors, notably those of Cuba; it is open to 
one ocean, but by nature closed to the other. 

In relation to the two continents of America this Western Mediter¬ 
ranean, as it has been not inaptly called, is so centrally placed that it 
lies midway between the storm-swept cliffs of Cape Horn and the far¬ 
thest settlements of the north; it receives the waters of some of the 
greatest rivers of the earth, whose commerce must flow across its sur¬ 
face, while its undeveloped shores, though still covered with jungle,, 
give promise by their climate and soil of becoming a region of wealth 
far greater than that which surrounds the Mediterranean itself, where 
the civilization of the world has grown from infancy to manhood—per¬ 
haps to old age. 

When the canal shall have joined the waters of the Pacific with 
those of the Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean will lie almost at the 
center of the world’s lines of trade and will become the meeting place 
of ships bound for every sea. 

Who can doubt that the barrier, so slight that from the interior 
heights the eye can reach both oceans,* will be cut, as has that of the 
Mediterranean, and that the water-girdle of the world will be com¬ 
pleted ! 

Then, when the jungles have been cleared from the shores of the 
western sea; when communications have been established and cities 

* From the summit of Irazu iu Costa Rica on a clear day both the Caribbean Sea 
and the Pacific Ocean may be seen. 




28 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


built, it may indeed be found that the world’s civilization has deserted 
the older shores, and the center of human life moved westward to the 
coast of the New World. 

It appears then that the waters of the Gulf of Mexico and of the 
^Caribbean Sea are inclosed by the territories of eight sovereign states, 
of two dependencies, and by a line of islands and smaller islets from 
which float the flags of five of the nations of Europe. Within these 
boundaries lie Jamaica, Navassa, the Grand Cayman, and a score of 
smaller possessions whose importance can only be estimated after the 
tide of commerce and the progress of civilization shall have given 
to these regions the importance they must finally possess. Upon the 
waters of these seas the flags of Great Britain, France, Spain, Hol¬ 
land, and Denmark, floating over outposts placed upon our very lines 
of transit between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, seem to threaten 
the destruction of the canal at the first breath of war with the United 
States. 

The mere presence of European powers in the Caribbean Sea does 
not mean a threat to the eanal or danger to the United States and its 
lines of communication. It is true that the Nicaragua Canal has an 
interest for every country that sends a ship to sea; but it is of primary 
importance either in peace or war only to a few, and its neutrality aud 
conservation to the interests of the United States can be destroyed by 
none but great maritime nations whose naval power is at least equal to 
that of this country. 

Those nations are Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, Germany, 
and Spain. From the attack of any other nation of the world the 
seaboards of the United States are measurably safe. The interior 
security of the canal, or its destruction by a band of marauders is not 
now under consideration. A child might almost disable it for a time, 
but the question of police protection is to be discussed hereafter. 

Probably we may eliminate Italy and Russia from the number of 
countries with which a difficulty could arise that should threaten the 
canal, since with either country a complication that threatened war 
with the United States is too remote to be considered here; and 
though it is evident that a mere paper guarantee of neutrality for 
the canal, and the protection of words alone, might be disregarded by 
these powers in the heat of a war in which the United States remained 
neutral; yet the violation of a neutrality guarded by the armed forces 
of this country would be an.act that any power of Europe would hes¬ 
itate to perform. 

With Great Britain, France, or even Germany and Spain, the case 
is somewhat different. If the lessons of history are accepted, and if 
the conflict of material interests is studied, it can hardly be doubted 
that there is an ever-present danger of war between the United States 
and those countries which possess territory near her borders, or whose 
producers look to the nations of this continent for their markets, and 
find that their home interests require the limitation of the trade and 
influence of the United States with other nations of America. 

With France and Spain, within the past thirty years, threatening 
events have occurred which led to the brink of war. With England a 
quarrel is ever on hand. Even with Germany at least one threatening 
dispute has arisen, though the possibility of a serious difficulty with 
that country is remote; unless indeed Germany, as the ally of some 
small southern republic, should attempt to curtail our influence in 
Mexico or the South, or should try to carry her new colonizing policy 
too near to our shores. 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


29 


A war between the United States and any single nation other than 
one of Europe would not even interrupt the even tenor of our way. 
Of course we may have to tight a coalition of European and American 
powers, or a combination of European nations; but the danger is 
remote, and considering the strength of the navies and of the mercan¬ 
tile marine of the countries of the world, it appears that interference 
with an American canal under the actual protection of the United 
States can conie^mly from Great Britain, France, Spain or Germany, 
or from a war in which one of these countries at least is engaged. In 
such a case the navies of these countries will constitute our danger, 
and it may be well to consider somewhat more in detail the jmssessions 
which could be used as outposts of attack against the coasts of the 
United States or against a canal in Nicaragua. 

European nations do not hold possessions on our coasts for revenue 
only. If this were the case many such unprofitable holdings would 
long since have been abandoned. No doubt the colonies are held in 
some instances because they have long been possessions of their pres¬ 
ent owners; and in others because no one will take them ofi' their 
owners’ hands: but they are held chiefly because of their strategic 
importance, and of their value as naval and coaling stations. Many of 
these possessions are fortified, but most of the defensive works are old 
and useless, and some date back to the days of the buccaneers. 

On the shores and islands of the Caribbean Sea and of the Gulf of 
Mexico there are English land defenses at Georgetown, British Guiana, 
Bridgetown, Barbadoes, St. Lucia, Kingston, and Nassau, but none 
are of great strength, for England seems to have placed her more 
powerful works nearer to the vitals of the United States. 

France has a fortification at Fort de France in Martinique, while 
Spain has strong defenses at Havana and a score of more or less 
dilapidated works at Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Santiago, and other places 
on the coast of Cuba and of Porto Bico. 

Denmark has fortified St. Thomas after a fashion, and even the 
Netherlands have defenses at Cura 5 oa. Though these works are of 
little present importance, except perhaps those at Jamaica and Havana,, 
they serve to mark important bases of operation against the American 
coasts and could readily be converted into strong harbors of refuge and 
depots of supplies. Many are already by cable in touch with the home 
government. 

On the mainland surrounding the Gulf of Mexico and the Carribbean 
Sea there are few fortifications besides our own antiquated works. 
The most important of all, perhaps, is the historic fort of San Juan de 
Uloa at Vera Cruz, once a magnificent work, but one that even in its 
time of strength seems to have fallen before every breath of attack, and 
has now come to be used as a mere prison. Besides this, there still stand 
a few old relics of pirate days, built on the shores of island or mainland 
and standing as monuments to Spain, the nation which Macaulay calls 
“that mighty empire on which the sun never sets.” 

But it would seem that first in the West Indies, as she is first in 
rivalry of the United States wherever the products of civilization and 
the genius of man are in demand, comes England, our chief rival in 
interest in the canal. 

Blundering as England often seems in the management of questions 
which affect her empire, changeable and uncertain in her policy 
towards her own colonies, she has yet steadily pursued towards the 
United States a course of self-interest that would seem threatening 
were it not for the firmly established, and perhaps well-grounded, belief 


30 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


that Great Britain dares not, as well as cares not, come to an open 
rupture with this country, unless driven into a position from which 
there is no other escape but by the sacrifice of honor or money. Into 
such a position it is neither the wish nor the interest of the United 
States to drive any nation, least of all England, whose interests, though 
strongly conflicting with our own in some directions, are in others as 
strongly in accord. 

To say nothing of the inevitable Indian and European complications 
that would come upon England in the event of wj£ with the United 
States, money and the interests of property, which are becoming, if 
they have not already become, a more powerful argument in questions 
of peace and war than armed strength itself, will exert their influ¬ 
ence for peace in all questions that may arise between the two great 
divisions of the English-speaking world. Nevertheless, for years past 
England has seemed to quietly pursue a policy- towards the United 
States that would indicate on her part the expectation of a struggle to 
come. 

It is probable that English statesmen could give other and very 
good reasons for the circuinvallation of our frontier by her fortresses, 
naval stations, railroads, cables, and interior lines of water com¬ 
munication; for the constant talk and actual work upon her naval 
stations; for her extension of territory in Belize and attempted con¬ 
trol of the Mosquito coast; and for her steady acquisition of islands of 
the Pacific ever nearer to our shores. As late as 1891 England took 
possession of Johnston Island, that land nearest to our coast and west 
of the Hawaiian group, and the fact remains that English policy has 
for fifty years been steadily, if slowly, weaving around us a web that 
in war we shall find difficulty in breaking through. 

On the north, Halifax has become a great imperial fortress. The Cana¬ 
dian Canal at the Sault and the constant agitation of the question of 
an interior waterway from the St. Lawrence to the lakes, mean nothing 
less than the desire to secure for English gunboats a road that shall 
be secure from the dangers of the upper St. Lawrence and the destruc¬ 
tion of the Welland Canal, the key to the ocean. Southward, in the 
Atlantic, some 580 miles from the Carolina coast, lies the British island 
of Bermuda, or rather a group of 365 islets, rising hardly above the 
ocean but capable of being converted into a gigantic fortress, even now 
supplied with the necessities of a naval base. Here are maintained 
large supplies of coal, a great iron floating dock and smaller slip, and 
machine shops for the repair of ships of large size. Here also is a cable 
connection with Halifax and the rest of the world, which is to be con¬ 
tinued to Nassau and other English islands of the West Indies. Ber¬ 
muda is a place that would be difficult to capture in the event of war, 
except in the absence of the British fleet. Even then it could be 
attacked only from a distance, for the channel of approach to the chief 
harbor, Hamilton, is so devious that land batteries and torpedoes could 
probably prevent the entrance of hostile ships. It is said, and I believe 
truly, that large reserve supplies of coal and ammunition are kept at 
Hamilton. The English ships rendezvous here, and garrisons are main¬ 
tained of considerable though varying strength at fortifications that 
are formidable even as they stand and can quickly be made very pow¬ 
erful indeed. To the unbiased mind, Bermuda looks uncommonly like 
a base for naval operations directed against the only power worth con¬ 
sidering in this quarter, namely, the United States. 

South of Bermuda and next in the chain of British outposts sur¬ 
rounding our frontiers comes Nassau, chief town of the Bahamas and 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


31 


a station for coaling and repair of ships. It is not an important station 
as it stands, though possessing a small garrison and an ancient 
fort that might be put in effective condition. Then come Turks and 
Oaicos islands, of which the Grand Turk is chief, a small collection of 
sandy islets where even coal is not kept on hand; then follow the sta¬ 
tions of Jamaica, where coal and supplies are to be had and consider¬ 
able garrisons are maintained, chiefly at Kingston and Port Royal, 
whose fortifications are not formidable in their present state, but can 
soon be placed in a condition to defend effectively the dangerous chan¬ 
nel leading to Kingston harbor, and serve to convert the latter into a 
safe refuge and naval base. 

Passing by Anguilla, where no coal is to be had, the English line of 
colonies continues to St. Christopher (St. Kitts), where a small coal 
supply and minor repair shops are placed, as also on the neighboring 
island of Antigua, and continues on to the ports of Dominica, which are 
not important. Then comes Port Castries, St. Lucia, where are placed 
a government coaling station and facilities for small repairs; here it is 
said an important naval station is to be established. * At St. Vincent 
also a small supply of coal is kept, but no repair works, and the same 
is true for Grenada ; while at Barbados there are a government coal¬ 
ing station and a newly finished dock. A strong detachment of 
British troops is kept here. Then comes Trinidad with its coaling 
station, and at Georgetown, Demerara coal is to be had and a dock and 
repair works exist. Besides these, on the mainland, coaling and dock¬ 
ing facilities are found at Belize. 

On the Pacific coast supplies and coal may be obtained at the Queen 
Charlotte Islands, at Fort Rupert, Coinox, Nanaimo, and at Vancouver, 
Port Moody, Victoria and Esquimalt. At Vancouver and Victoria are 
facilities for repairs, while at Esquimalt large government dockyards 
are some day to be* defended by heavy batteries. There has been much 
discussion regarding the fortification of this important place, and 
reports have frequently appeared stating that heavy modern guns were 
about to be placed in position there. Up to the present time, however, 
nothing has been done at Esquimalt, whose existing defenses are old 
and useless. It is possible that a second Imperial fortress will erelong 
be placed at this important gate to Canada. 

South of Puget Sound, on the Pacific, England, however, is in no 
better case than is the United States in regard to supplies and coal. 
She has no positions within some thousands of miles of the mainland 
and must like ourselves depend upon the uncertain chance of purchase. 

But besides the islands of the Gulf and Caribbean Sea, which have 
been mentioned, Her Majesty, the Queen, lays claim to other less 
important territory like the islands of the Cayman group, of which the 
Grand Cayman might, in the event of the completion of the canal, 
become a place of importance. 

It would be absurd to suppose that all these coaling and naval 
stations are maintained by England as threats against the United 
States; evidently they are merely the necessities of a great maritime 
nation. They have been enumerated here simply to show the advan¬ 
tages England would possess in a struggle for control of the canal. 
But it is perhaps not too much to say that far-seeing Englishmen, 
looking forward to the time when an American canal, like that at Suez, 
shall give another route to Australia and the East, have endeavored 
in American waters to reproduce the conditions of the Mediterranean, 
and have sought to carry the line of British possessions westward to 
the new canal as they have carried the flag of England eastward from 


32 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus to the shores of the Red Sea and the 
islands of the Persian Gulf, almost stealing Egypt on the march, and 
wresting by the power of British gold and the foresight of a Beacons- 
field from the very projectors of the first great canal the reward of 
their endeavor. Of the British possessions in this quarter, the island 
of Perim, Aden, Somaliland, Socotra, and* the Bahrein Islands in the 
Persian Gulf, Aden at least is being strongly fortified. 

It is certain that English successes at Suez, her attempts to gain a 
footing on the Mosquito coast of Nicaragua, her encroachments at Belize, 
her power in Mexico, Central America, and Chile—which is none the 
less strong because it is wielded through railroad and commercial com¬ 
panies and private individuals—and her aggressions in Venezuela, need 
leave no illusion as to English interests in America nor as to the course 
she would like to pursue regarding any canal that may be built across 
the isthmus. 

But with the American canal she will hardly venture to disregard 
the “ Hands off !” of President Monroe, repeated forcibly by President 
Hayes, and thundered to the European world by the greatest of recent 
American Secretaries, Mr. Blaine. 

The possessions of France on the American coast, and especially those 
in the vicinity of the canal, are interesting but by no means dangerous. 
The few islands of the West Indies left to France after the victories of 
Rodney and Jarvis have hardly, if at all, been increased in number or 
importance since the times of the great English admirals. 

Of the Lesser Antilles, France now holds only Guadeloupe and its 
dependencies, with a total area of about 722 square miles and a popu¬ 
lation of 165,899. Here, near Pointe a Pitre, are a French coaling sta¬ 
tion and small Government repair shops. Martinique, with 381 squaie 
miles and a population of some 175,000, has a Government coaling sta¬ 
tion at Fort de France and at St. Pierre, with a large dock at the former 
port and repair shops at both; while at Cayenne there are Government 
coaling depot and repair shops and a population of about 10,500. The 
only French islands on the American coast are St. Pierre and Miquelon, 
close to the shores of Newfoundland. These small islands have a popu¬ 
lation of some 6,000, and the former a floating dock and a Government 
coaling station. Evidently the French colonies in the West Indies are 
of no great importance. 

From Germany the isolation of the United States is, in a material 
sense, much more complete even than from France. In spite of the fact 
that in 1884 the German Empire began to be attacked by the craving for 
foreign territory which has characterized England for the past century 
or two, and has cost France so heavily, Germany has still no colonies 
proper. True she has thrown the protection of the German flag over 
various sections of the earth’s surface, and has sometimes in her eager¬ 
ness run herself into international difficulties, as in the case of the Caro¬ 
line Islands and Samoa; but no “protected” German territory lies 
nearer our coast than the Marshall Islands, several thousand miles 
away. 

With Spain the case is different; for, thrust between the territory 
of the two great republics of America, and separated from the one only 
by the narrow “ silver streak ” called the Strait of Florida and from 
the other by the almost equally narrow channel of Yucatan, lies Cuba. 
This “Bulwark of the Antilles and Key of the New World,”* as the 
old Spanish chronicles called her chief city, Mistress of the Gulf as she 
may some day prove if hostile to nations bordering the inland sea, due 


* Llave del Nuevo Mundo, Antemural de las Antillas. 



NICARAGUA CANAL. 


33 


north of Nicaragua is a wedge of European territory thrust between 
our southern coast and what may eventually become our most valuable 
outpost, situated in the very path of trade through this canal. 

With her fertile territory hardly producing one-tenth of its possible 
output, her magnificent harbors—of which many like Cabanas and 
Havana, have hardly their rivals in the world—and with her million 
and a half of people, Cuba is indeed the key to any canal constructed 
on the isthmus. 

But this key must be held by stronger and bolder hands than those 
of Spain before it can lock this waterway of the world and threaten 
American interests in Nicaragua. In spite of flurries such as that caused 
by the Virginius affair, Cuba in the possession of Spain is perhaps in 
the position to cause least uneasiness to the United States. No other 
country likely to possess the island could less threaten our interests, 
which are best served by Cuba remaining as she is. A stronger owner 
might threaten the United States, and as a part of our domain she 
would be most undesirable; for there is no place in a republic for her 
million and a quarter of creoles, half-castes, and negroes, and no room 
within our borders for her sickly coasts and festering cities. Cuba 
independent must soon fall under the control of some great power 
greedy for fresh territory, unless, indeed, the world is prepared to allow 
another Black Republic to arise in the Caribbean Sea. 

The case is measurably the same with Porto Rico, the only other 
western possession remaining to Spain of the world that was discovered 
and conquered by her people. 

Porto Rico is perhaps the most healthful of all the Antilles; it is well 
peopled and rich; but in the hands of Spain can hardly be considered 
important in its relations to the Nicaragua canal. It seems most im¬ 
probable that Spain, with her few foreign possessions, small trade, a nd 
natural conservatism, will take any interest or exercise any control in 
the affairs of an American canal. 

Of the remaining European countries possessing colonies and naval 
stations in the Caribbean Sea little need be said. Probably both Den¬ 
mark and the Netherlands would prefer to see the neutrality of the 
canal guaranteed by a power that would always permit access to their 
ships, rather than by their neighbors in Europe who have been known 
to become forgetful of the rights of neutrals. But the attitude of these 
states is not important. 

Such are the surroundings of the eastern approach to the canal of 
Nicaragua. The western entrance is washed by the waters of the wide 
Pacific which for thousands of miles touch only the coasts of Spanish- 
Am erica. 

But now let us consider briefly the route of the canal and some of 
the physical characteristics of the country through which it passes, and 
of the water way itself. 

The line, as finally adopted, is from San .man del Norte (named 
Grey town by the English) on the Caribbean Sea, to Brito on the 
Pacific; its total length is 169-4 miles, of which 26-7 is canal proper, 
and 142-6 is free navigation by the Lake of Nicaragua, the river San 
Juan, and the basins formed in the valleys of the Deseado, San Fran¬ 
cisco, and Tola. The summit level, Lake Nicaragua, is at its mean 110 
feet above the mean level of the sea. The sea level is reached on each 
side by three locks. For details see Senate Ex. Hoc. No. 5, Fifty-first 
Congress, second session, from which much of these data are taken; also 
report of Major C. E. Hutton, U. S. A. 

From Greytown the canal passes through a low region covered by 
forests and jungle to higher lands above the junction of the small 
S. Ex. 74--3 



34 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


rivers Desea do and San Juanillo; thence across a more rolling country 
<still covered with forest and little settled, to the divide which separates 
the valley of the Deseado from that of the San Francisco; crosses to 
the latter valley, and continues over a forest covered country where 
ridges alternate with swamps to the San Juan river at Ochoa. 

Ochoa lies nearly opposite the junction of the San Juan with its large 
tributary, the San Carlos, and from this point tbe canal follows the 
former stream to the outlet of Lake Nicaragua. In this part of its 
course the river San Juan tiows through an almost uninhabited wilder¬ 
ness. A pile of wood here, a corn patch there, or perhaps two or three 
wretched huts surrounded by a few clumps of bananas, as at Machuca 
and the Toro rapids, are the oidy signs of human life to be seen from 
Greytown to the lake, excepting the queer little village of Castillo 
Viejo, where an antiquated fort recalls the days of Spanish rule in 
America—a strange sight in the depths of a howling wilderness. 

The river as it tiows varies little in width from source to mouth; it is 
here deep, there shallow, but is always the same muddy stream, run¬ 
ning on through dense walls of jungle, apparently as solid as the 
mountain side yet delicate as a mass of feathery lace draped upon a 
framework of green. The banks seem generally low, but from the lake 
to the sea there is hardly a square yard of rock or earth uncovered. 

At the outlet of Lake Nicaragua stands the settlement of San Carlos, 
surrounding another queer little fort perched upon a hill that rises per- 
Jiaps 30 feet above the level of the lake, the only high land on this 
eastern shore. All around San Carlos lies a region of forest and 
swamp dreary enough to the eye, except where it stretches away west¬ 
ward across the beautiful lake to the distant mountains of Costa Eica 
and the Pacific shore; or to the nearer hills that rise from the lake 
itself and mark the islands of Solentename or the more distant peak of 
Ometepe. 

At the outlet of the lake the Eio Frio joins the San Juan, and is, 
with the exception of the San Carlos, the only important tributary of 
the main stream between the lake and Ochoa. Both tributaries flow 
from the south and have their sources in the mountains of Costa Eica. 
From San Carlos to the west, the shore of the Lake of Nicaragua, some¬ 
times high, more often low, extends in almost unbroken wilderness 
amidst which the few settlements are buried in heavy forests. There 
are many islands, most of them beautiful in appearance, fertile and 
often inhabited. The more important, such as the Solentename group, 
and the large island of Ometepe, in addition to having a healthy climate 
and fertile soil, are high and wind-swept, yet afford sufficient shelter 
for shipping against the lake storms—by no means contemptible. 

From the Lake of Nicaragua westward, the canal crosses a hilly but 
well settled region which produces much coffee, cacao, and cane. * It is 
in fact the garden of Nicaragua, where the climate is good, if hot, and 
the comparatively scanty rainfall prohibits the excessive growth of 
vegetation that characterizes the eastern slope. 

The important bearing which climatic conditions have upon military 
operations, especially in tropical countries, has seldom been given the 
consideration which is due the subject. Impressed by personal expe¬ 
riences while in Nicaragua with the extreme value of such observations, 
and with a knowledge of their incompleteness, 1 requested from the 
chief of my corps, (Jen. A. W. Greely, whose meteorological researches 
are well known, some information in this direction. Gen. Gieely, in 
Appendix No. 1, brings into concrete shape the scattered and disjointed 
observations hitherto inaccessible to military students. He sets forth 
clearly the climatic conditions, as far as known, bearing on this sub- 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


35 


ject, and indicates the extreme difficulties under which military opera¬ 
tions of any kind, apart from those on water, must be conducted, 
except during the months from December to April, inclusive. 

It is now necessary to consider the line in detail. 

The route may be divided as follows: (1) the Eastern Division, from 
the inner harbor of Greytown to the San Francisco Basin, length, 18*8 
miles; (2) the San Francisco Division, from the western end of the 
Divide Out to the river San Juan at Ochoa, length, 12-5 miles; (3) the 
Lake and River Division, from Ochoa to western coast of Lake Nicar¬ 
agua, length, 121-4 miles; (4) the Western Division, from the Lake of 
Nicaragua to Brito, length, 17 miles. 

The length of the several sections of the proposed canal are: 


- ^ Miles. 

Greytown to Lock 1. 9 -24- 

Lock 1 to Lock 2, canal. 1 -2-j- 

Lock 2 to Lock 3, canal. 1 -64- 

Lock 2 to Lock 3, basin. 1 '74- 

Lock 3 to western end of eastern Divide Cut, canal. 2 -9-j- 

Lock 3 to western end of eastern Divide Cut, Deseado Basin. 3 -f- 

Western eud of Divide Cut to Ochoa, canal. 1 -24- 

Western eud of Divide Cut to Ochoa, San Francisco Basin. 11 -2-j- 

River San Juan to Toro Rapids. 37 

River San Juan where dredging is needed. 27 -54- 

Lake Nicaragua .v- . 56 -5-f- 

Lake to western eud of Divide Cut, canal. 1 -54- 

Western Divide Cut, canal. 4 -9-f- 

Divide Cut to east end of Tola Basin, canal. 2 -S-j- 

West end of Tola Basin to Lock 4, basin. 5 -5-j- 

Lock 5 to Lock 6, canal. 1 -5-f- 

Lock 6 to harbor at Brito, canal. -5-f 



The eastern terminus of the canal, Greytown, or San Juan del Norte, 
lies near the mouth of the river San Juan or rather near the northern 
outlet of that stream, whose main flow is through the southern branch, 
called the Colorado. 


































36 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


Greytown now contains about 2.000 people, who are a mixed lot of 
Nicaraguans, West Indian negroes, and hybrids of varying degrees of 
color. Besides these, there are, or were in the active days of canal 
construction, large numbers of drifting whites, drawn hither by the 
opening of the canal and some of whom have not been able to “move 
on.” 

The town lies on a well sheltered harbor about 2 miles inside the 
bar, which, until the construction of the present jetty, was a sand bank 
rising above the water level. It is surrounded by jungle, and lies almost 
in a marsh above which it hardly rises at any season, and in times of 
heavy rain is flooded. The rainfall is tremendous, over 250 inches 
annually, and as much as 300 inches in a year has been known; the 
rainy season does not come with the regularity found inland, and the 
smallest rainfall occurs between the middle of January and the end of 
May. 

The houses are very generally of wood, mean and unsightly in appear¬ 
ance, with the filthy surroundings usual in tropical America. The water 
is bad; the atmosphere hot and moisture laden; vegetation grows rank 
on al sides; and it would seem that the comparatively favorable sani¬ 
tary statistics shown by the doctors can only be due to the hardy class 
of men who have formed the qhief element from which the statistics 
were probably gathered. However this may be, Greytown is said to 
be not an unhealthy place—as places go on the Gulf and along the 
shores of the Caribbean Sea. 

Separated from Greytown by the section of the canal already exca¬ 
vated, is a long, low, sandy beach extending'Seaward and flanking the 
harbor and bar. On this are placed the storehouses, officers, mess- 
rooms, officers’ quarters, in fact most of the buildings of the canal com¬ 
pany; and in front of them all a light tramway runs as far as the hos¬ 
pital, at the outer end of the settlement. This is part of Ciudad America, 
over which the company has been given certain rights by the Govern¬ 
ment of Nicaragua. The place is wind-swept, clean, and said to be 
healthy, though inclosed on the land side by marsh and jungle; good 
water is brought here; the buildings of wood and iron are clean, cool, 
and ecfmfortable. In short, this little settlement is a charming oasis in 
the desert of Nicaraguan heat and dirt. It may be remarked in passing 
that a better place for the permanent quarters of a garrison could not 
perhaps be found on the southern coast of the Caribbean Sea. 

In front of Ciudad America lies the harbor bar; and beyond it the 
jetty, which it is thought, will by the aid of dredges, give a depth of 
water at the entrance sufficient to admit the largest vessels. This har¬ 
bor, once so deep and commodious that the largest ships could lie in 
safety, is now much filled up; but a basin is to be dredged to a depth of 
30 feet. When this is done the harbor of Greytown will be an excel¬ 
lent though small haven; but the entrance will no doubt always be 
narrow and probably difficult at times for ships to make, for Grejtiown 
is placed near the center of the trade-wind belt, and as a rule there is 
considerable sea running on this coast. It would seem, from a military 
point of view, that well-placed land defenses and torpedoes could most 
effectively close the eastern terminus of the canal even without the 
assistance of floating batteries. 

From Greytown harbor the canal will run at the sea level for about 
9 miles through a flat, swampy region covered by forests and jungle 
to Lock No. 1. Along this portion of the line a railway will extend as 
far as the junction of the canal with the river San Juan. 

Near Lock No. 1, the canal will reach the foot-hills which begin to 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


37 


inclose tlie valley of the river Deseado, a stream that up to this point 
hows through a low, swampy plain like that of the San Juanillo from 
its junction with the Deseado to the harbor of Grey town. About 10 
miles from Greytown the valley of the Deseado becomes more clearly 
defined; it will be followed by the canal which, by two additional locks 
and embankments, will convert the river and valley into three lakes 
or basins. 

The three locks with lifts respectively of 31, 30, and 45 feet, will be 
unprecedented in size. The distance from Lock No. 1 to Lock No. 3 
will be about 3| miles, and it is evident that a very small effort here 
could cripple, perhaps destroy, the canal, and that this may be con¬ 
sidered a vital section. 

About 3 miles above Lock No. 3 is to begin what is called the 
u Great Divide Cut,” through which it is intended to carry the water¬ 
way from the valley of the Deseado to that of the San Francisco—a 
somewhat small river flowing into the San Juan from the western 
watershed of the u Divide Ridge.” 



This cut, through what is thought to be solid volcanic rock, is to 
have a length of 2.9 miles and an average depth of about 140 feet: 
the water cross section is to be 80 feet wide by 30 feet deep, and on 
either side is to be a foot-way 5 feet wide. 

Evidently this Divide Cut may be considered a danger point but 
less vital, as it could be less easily harmed than the section of locks 
and embankments below. To injure the Divide Cut materially, high 
explosives in such large quantities must be used that much difficulty 
would be found by an enemy in obtaining and placing them in such a 
region. 

From the western end of the Divide Cut the canal will be carried 
a distance of approximately 11 miles, through three basins formed 
by confining the waters of the Clianchos, San Francisco and the Danta 
by embankments. These embankments will be numerous and, it is 
said, at least eight of them will be some 60 feet in height. The 
material is to be rock fill and earth backing, or as also recommended, 
“loose rock.” Any of these embankments could be destroyed even 
without explosives, and as the destruction of one would mean at least 
the temporary disablement of the canal, this distance of 11 miles may 
be looked upon as a second vital section. 

From the basin of the Danta to the San Juan, a distance of about 
2.5 miles, the canal will be in general an easily constructed waterway, 
thought to pass chiefly through clay, and crossing a succession of 
ridges and their connecting valleys. To cut the canal here would 
probably do little damage, and that easily repaired; but from the 
western end of the Divide Cut to the river San Juan, there are to 
be no less than 67 embankments, aggregating in length of crest more 
than 30,500 feet. The destruction of any one of these would, it is 




38 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


probable, temporarily disable the canal. But the damage might not 
be serious. 

The most important point of the canal, the peg in fact upon which 
the whole system hangs, will be Ochoa. Here is to be placed the great 
dam of the San Juan River, and from Ochoa, slack-water navigation 
will extend up the San Juan to the lake of Nicaragua, across the lat¬ 
ter, and on to within 3.5 miles of the Pacific. The dam destroyed, the 
entire eastern system from the lake of Nicaragua to the Caribbean Sea 
goes back to natural conditions, and transit for any but very small 
boats will become impossible. 

Upon the successful construction and maintenance of the dam at 
Ochoa, the whole system rests. It is the vital point of the canal. The 
great dam is to be located between two steep hills; its length of weir 
upon the crest will be 1,250 feet, and abutments 050 feet, giving a 
total length of 1,900 feet. The average height above the river bottom 
will be 6 L feet; the thickness at top 25 feet; and at bottom 500 feet, 
as stated, if the dam be constructed of stone and concrete.- The site 
chosen is 3 miles from the junction of the river San Carlos with the 
river San Juan. 

At Ochoa a long narrow lake will be formed by the overflow of the 
San Carlos. This lake is to be confined on the east by a series of 
embankments, 21 in all, closing short depressions in the ridge which 
follows the general course of the San Carlos on the east. 

The aggregate length of these embankments on the crest will be 
about 5,540 feet; their width on top 15 feet; their material clay. Evi¬ 
dently they could be easily destroyed, with the probable effect of 
reducing the level of the narrow lake and of rendering the San Juan 
unnavigable for ships. 

By the Ochoa dam a depth of water is obtained sufficient for all ves¬ 
sels for a distance of 64*5 miles of the San Juan River Valley to the 
outlet of Lake Nicaragua. This stretch of river will be converted by 
the latter into a waterway, having few obstructions and one in which 
there will be no greater danger of interruption to transit than is the 
case with ordinary rivers having a narrow channel in parts. 

TheNship channel, except for 28 miles from the lake to the Toro Rapids, 
will nowhere be less than 1,000 feet wide with a minimum depth of 28 
feet. ^ 

In this section there will be many strong positions where defensive' 
works could effectually close the passage; but it is to be remembered 
that the region is an impassable wilderness, practically without sup¬ 
plies and wholly without roads. The face of the country is covered 
with dense jungle, and the river is the only highway. It might be 
temporarily obstructed like any other river, but the highway can not 
be destroyed. 

The important strategic positions above Ochoa are Castillo; a stretch 
of bank perhaps half a mile long between the Diamante and Macliuca 
rapids; the Toro Rapids; a few minor positions above; and San Carlos 
on the eastern shore of the lake. 

For about 14 miles through the soft bottom of the lake a channel will 
be dredged to deep water. 

Some 12 miles from San Carlos lie the islands of Solentename, already 
mentioned, where, or at Ometepe, directly off Virgin Bay, the western 
entrance of the canal, advantageous locations for depots of supplies, 
military and naval stores, are found. 

From the eastern channel there is free and unobstructed navigation 
through the lake to within about one-half mile of the western outlet; 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 39 

thence a channel is to be cut and piers constructed to insure easy en¬ 
trance to and exit from the canal; but the point is unimportant. 

From the lake at the mouth of the river Lajas, the canal is to be 
carried westward at the lake level and through low ground for about 
l‘p miles. Here the ground begins to rise gradually to the Pacific 
divide. From lake to Pacific the distance is, approximately, 17 miles. 
Beyond the stretch mentioned, in which there is no point of importance, 
the canal cut becomes deeper; proceeding now through rock it crosses, 
at 4*7 miles from the lake, the lowest point of the continental divide 
that exists from the snow fields of the North to the wastes of Patagonia., 
This point is 152 feet above the mean level of the Pacific and 43 feet 
above the final level of Lake Nicaragua. 

One and three-quarters miles beyond this the canal will reach the 
narrow valley of the Rio Grande, a stream that frequently “goes dry,’* 
and following this for 1*5 miles will cut across a broad plain and enter 
the basin of the Tola, 9 miles from the lake. 

This basin will be the terminus of the long summit level of the canal, 
which will in reality extend from Lock No. 3 to the western end of Tola, 
where are to lie Locks Nos. 4 and 5, and a second great dam. The place 
where these are to be constructed is called La Flor. 

The Tola basin opens towards the Pacific in a narrow defile through 
the hills; it is at present dry. 



The dam to be constructed at La Flor will be 1,800 feet long and 70 
feet high; it will act to transform the present valley of the Tola into a 
lake. Evidently this dam will be very susceptible to harm, since the 
lower side will be exposed and can be followed dry-shod along the 
base from abutment to abutment. It will lie about 3-5 miles from the 
Pacific. 

Locks Nos. 4 and 5 are to be placed on a hill north of the dam. 
Should the dam and locks be destroyed, the canal would become useless 
until they were replaced; and though repair might not be as difficult 
in the case of La Flor dam as it would be with that at Ochoa, the 
seeming ease with which the former could be destroyed and the impor¬ 
tant and complicated works placed there make La Flor a place to be 
carefully guarded. La Flor is the vital point of the Pacific section. 

From locks Nos. 4 and 5 a stretch of canal extends 1-25 miles to 
Lock No. 6, the most westerly of all. This may be considered as a fifth 
vital point, the last existing. 

From Lock No. 6 the canal will extend about 0-5 mile to Brito. This 
stretch will really be a part of the harbor at that place. 

No harbor now exists at Brito, but the design is to construct a shelter 
there by means of breakwaters. On the west of the canal entrance a 




NICARAGUA CANAL. 


0 

rocky promontory stretches out into the sea and from this a break¬ 
water is to extend 900 feet towards a second jetty built out normal to 
the beach. The proposed harbor will then be partly in the deep water 
inclosed by the jetties; but the main part will be formed by excavating 
a portion of the alluvial valley lying at the outlet of the canal. The 
whole will form a deep, broad basin running 3,000 feet within the pres¬ 
ent shore line at high water, and 3,900 feet from the entrance between 
the jetties. An extension of this harbor will be formed bythe canal 
itself, excavated to the sea level and having larger dimensions than 
ordinary for 3,000 feet farther inland. Here a tide lock is to be placed. 
It is thought that this makeshift harbor will answer its purpose. The 
Pacific here is a quiet ocean; heavy winds usually blow offshore, and 
storms are of rare occurrence. 

It is evident that batteries on the hills near the canal, and torpedoes 
placed, within the dredgings, would close the western entrance; but 
considering the destructible character of the shelters and the proba¬ 
bility that Locks Nos. 4, 5, and 6, the tide lock, and even La Flor dam, 
may be reached by fire from the sea, floating defenses are far more 
necessary here than at the Atlantic outlet. Bombardment by war¬ 
ships oft - Greytown could hardly damage the canal materially, since 
the first vital point lies some 10 miles from the harbor, and will no 
doubtdbe hidden from the sea as well as be at the extreme range of the 
heaviest artillery of ships off the coast. The harm possible from bom¬ 
bardment to Greytown itself, such as injury to shops and material, 
would be slight even if floating batteries could not be spared to assist 
land works and torpedo defenses placed there. 

But at Brito the case is different. The vitals of the Pacific section 
all lie within easy range of shipping, for they are but 3J miles from 
the coast. The water is deep well inshore, and as the canal will run 
almost in a straight line from coast to locks it forms a broad highway 
through which ships’ guns could probably reach the important works 
of the Pacific section. It would seem that in spite of the heaviest land 
defenses likely to be built, warships would be necessary here in the 
event of hostilities that should threaten the safety of the canal. 

From this sketch of the canal system it appears that there are five 
localities where are to be placed those constructions upon which the 
life of the whole depends. They are not equally vulnerable, nor would 
the destruction of some be as fatal as that of others, since the rapidity 
and ease of repair differ; nevertheless, they must all be constantly and 
carefully guarded. 

In the order of their importance, tlib sections of the canal seem to be: 

(1) The Ochoa dam and the embankments of the San Carlos. 

(2) La Flor dam and Locks Nos. 4 and 5. 

(3) Locks Nos. 1, 2, and 3, with their accompanying dams and 
embankments, forming the basin of the Desea do. 

(4) Lock No. 6. 

(5) The embankments forming the basins of the Chanchos, San 
Francisco, and Danta. 

There are, of course, many minor points where great harm might be 
inflicted, perhaps even a temporary paralysis of the canal system pro¬ 
duced. 

Injury at either of the “divide cuts,” at the eastern lower levels, at 
the western levels from the lake to the Tola basion or even obstructions 
placed in the River San Juan, might produce serious results; but to 
effect any considerable damage to the canal at other than vital points,* 
time and large means of producing injury must be at hand. 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


41 


In the Lake of Nicaragua and through the greater part of the river 
San Juan vessels can travel at unrestricted speed; but in some sec¬ 
tions of the river and in the basin the speed will be somewhat checked 
on account of the curves, though the channel at all points will be deep 
and of considerable width. 

The estimated speed of transit by steamer is: For canal, in all about 
20 miles, 5 miles per hour; for river basins, in all 21*6 miles, 7 miles per 
hour; for the river San Juan, in all 04*5 miles, 8 miles per hour; for the 
Lake of Nicaragua, in all 56*5 miles, 10 miles per hour; for each lock, 
forty-five minutes. From this it is seen that in an ordinary transit across 
the isthmus a vessel may be supposed to require about two hours to 
pass from Greytowu harbor to lock 1; to remain in lock 1 about forty- 
five minutes; to pass the canal between locks 1 and 2 in about fifteen 
minutes; to remain in lock 2 about forty-five minutes; to pass lock 3 
in about thirty minutes; to remain in lock 3 about forty-five minutes; 
to reach the eastern end of the divide cut in about thirty-five minutes, 
and to remain in the divide cut about twenty-five minutes. From the 
western end of the divide cut to the San Juan Kiver at Ochoa will 
require about one hour and fifty minutes; thence by river to the Lake 
of Nicaragua, under ordinary conditions of steaming, will require about 
eight hours, and in the lake itself about five and a half hours for 
transit. 

In descending to the Pacific a vessel will require, to pass through 
canal from the lake to the western divide cut, about twenty minutes. 
She will remain in the western divide cut about one hour and in the 
canal from divide cut to the east end of Tola Basin about thirty min¬ 
utes. From the east end of Tola Basin to lock 4 will require about 
forty-five minutes, and about one hour and thirty minutes to remain in 
locks 4 and 5. After leaving lock 5 about fifteen minutes will be taken 
to pass through the canal to lock (>, and forty-five minutes in lock 
6. From lock 6 to Brito Harbor about seven, or say ten, minutes will 
be required. The total estimated time of transit at the rates of speed 
given is, therefore, about twenty-six hours thirty minutes; added to 
this one hour and thirty minutes, incidental delays, we have twenty- 
eight hours as the estimated time of transit from ocean to ocean under 
ordinary conditions. In case of need the time could no doubt be some¬ 
what shortened for lake and river transit, but for the sections of canal 
could not be materially lessened. 

Such is the proposed canal and such the strategic and political 
conditions waiting upon its construction. If the latter have been 
clearly and correctly stated, it would seem that the United States will 
insist upon treating the Nicaragua Canal as part of her coast line, and 
will look upon it as she would upon any other line of transit that she 
might control—open during peace to the whole world, to armed forces 
by courtesy, as well as to peaceful trade; in time of war closed to the 
war ships of belligerents unless the United States or the country in 
which the canal is constructed is engaged; not a strategic point in war¬ 
fare; and, in the event of war to which the United States is a party, 
absolutely American and as much under her protection as the Capital 
itself. 

Such is the meaning of the policy announced to the world by the 
United States. It would seem that its enforcement cannot be left to a 
“paper guaranty” that might fly away at the first shot of a cannon in 
a European war. 

No doubt the safety of so great a work against actual destruction 
would, under ordinary conditions of war, seem to be sufficiently assured 


42 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


by that moral law which, in recent times, appears to prevent civilized 
nations from destroying the great works of peace which are useful to 
mankind. We have seen a “paper guaranty’ 7 of neutrality effective 
for half a century at Panama, and a mere “ assurance that the sphere 
of operations should not be extended to the canal” sufficient at Suez 
to prevent interference with the world’s traffic there, even when this 
canal lay within the territory of one of the belligerents. But the 
Panama Railway does not invite attack or seizure from without, as a 
waterway would; and behind the mild assurance of exemption for the 
Suez Canal stood the guns of the British fleet and the land defenses 
on the route to India. 

Beside these considerations lies the fact that the enemies of a 
Nicaragua Canal may not always be highly civilized and controlled by 
the moral sense mentioned, or by any moral sense whatever. This 
could hardly fail to be the case if a Spanish American State were at 
war with Nicaragua; then no moral defense nor paper guaranty could 
protect the canal from harm. We have had sufficient experience with 
these countries of late years to know that they are not scrupulous in 
warfare, and, so far as the United States is concerned, that they have 
little dread, indeed little respect, for the distant power of this country. 
They do not realize it and can only be prevented by force from defying 
it. Actual defenses then must be provided by the United States 
both for external and internal protection, and it remains for the writer 
to suggest what he believes these defenses will be. 

The dangers to which the canal, built and in operation, is exposed 
are of two kinds—those that may arise in the country through which 
the canal passes and those which may come from without. 

From a foreign enemy it need be protected only at its outlets, since 
from the character of the country it can only be attacked through 
Greytown on the east; and on the west the danger space extends only 
for a distance of about 3*5 miles from Brito. 

Against an enemy within, the canal must be guarded at every vital 
point and carefully watched throughout. This police protection can 
not be given by either Nicaragua or Costa Rica. So it appears that 
against both classes of danger the canal must be protected by the 
United States alone. 

It has been said that u The military power of the United States, as 
shown by the recent civil war, is without limit, and in any conflict on 
the American continent is irresistible.” 

Considering this fact in connection with the strategic conditions 
outlined; the strength of foreign navies; the European military and 
naval stations near United States coasts; the position of European 
outposts in the Caribbean Sea; the probable numerical weakness of 
our own navy; its necessarily wide dispersion in the defense of our 
coast; the many uses to which it may be put in the attack; our utter 
lack of naval stations nearer than Florida, or perhaps Key West and 
Tortugas—it would seem to be mere folly to trust the defense of the 
canal to the Navy alone. 

The requirements of a navy and the conditions existing in the 
Caribbean Sea of themselves prevent this, and, compelling the es¬ 
tablishment of naval bases nearer the canal than our enemies’ outpost, 
naturally suggest that the United States place a well-fortified station 
and harbor of refuge at Greytown, and for the Pacific fleets a similar 
station at Brito. 

Other stations in the vicinity of these may be acquired, but none 
will be as valuable, since suitable land defenses here, besides affording 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


43 


protection to ships, coal, and supplies, close the canal to an enemy 
from without, protect it from seizure, besides keeping it open for the 
uses of the Uuited States under any probable conditions (except, of 
course, blockade by an enemy with a heavy preponderance of ships). 
In short, to hold the termini is to hold the canal from interference from 
without; for, considering the character of the country and its commu¬ 
nications, a flank attack in force from the east would be impossible; 
and from the west impracticable in face of war ships at Brito and a 
heavy garrison at that place. 

Such attack could come only from San Juan del Sur, or possibly from 
Corinto by advance through Nicaragua; and any probable force that 
could reach the canal would be small, deficient in artillery, and would 
be swept away by our cruisers in the canal and by the troops at Brito 
and La Flor. 

Greytown and Brito fortified and garrisoned, besides protecting the 
canal from foreign attack, will form the bases for land forces and gun¬ 
boats patrolling the canal or operating for its protection against maraud¬ 
ers and irresponsible rebels from the interior of Nicaragua or Costa 
Rica. 

This is very evident from the fact that the length of line to be guarded 
by troops will be, on the east, only from Greytown to Ochoa, a distance 
of 32*5 miles, traversed by railroad; and on the west the 3*5 miles from 
Brito to La Flor. The remainder of the line may be safely left to cruisers. 

It is thought that when the canal shall have been completed it will 
be found necessary to place at the eastern outlet, preferably along the 
coast of Ciudad America and on the opposite sideof the harbor entrance, 
sand and cement emplacements for heavy guns, rapid-fire guns, and 
all the essentials for torpedo defense and defense against boat attack. 
On this comparatively healthy strip of coast would be built, in accord¬ 
ance with the requirements of the climate, barracks, hospitals, repair 
shops, and everything needful for a large, self-sustaining garrison; 
this, with care, need not suffer in health, and in time of peace need 
not be large, but at the threat of war will be so heavily reinforced as 
to prevent all danger from attack here by ships or landing parties, or 
from possible boat attack at Ochoa by the way of the Colorado (should 
water enough remain in that stream for light-draft boats). 

From Greytown as a base an outpost (small in peace) could be thrown 
out to the Ochoa dam, which will be within easy reach—32*5 miles by 
rail. The railroad should be provided with a few armored cars, fitted 
for the use of field and rapid-fire guns, for the patrol of the eastern 
section of the canal as far as Ochoa and to aid the watchmen at the 
dams and basins between Greytown and the dam, if summoned by tele¬ 
graph or telephone. 

Possibly a small earthwork or two, armed with machine guns, should 
be placed at Ochoa; but as the only enemy to be anticipated would be 
armed with muskets, or possibly with a few light guns, no heavy works 
or large garrisons would be necessary here for interior defense, and no 
attack is, from the character of the country, to be anticipated from 
without. The detachment at Ochoa will be frequently changed on 
account of the danger of the climate, though this is probably not great. 

No other defenses would be needed on the Atlantic side of the canal 
and no garrisons need be placed along the line of slackwater naviga¬ 
tion or in the lake. Little exists in these sections necessary to guard, 
except such works as light houses and piers or depots, which may be 
left to the protection of"(say) two small cruisers suitable for lake and 
river navigation, armed with light guns. These cruisers will patrol 


44 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


the canal and guard against danger from the Rio Frio or from the San 
Carlos. They may well have a base of supplies on one of the islands 
of the Solentename group or on Ometepe. In either case the depot 
will be reasonably secure from interference if provided with a small 
garrison. 

The Pacific section would be guarded by landed defenses at Brito, 
as heavy as may be, and provided with all the accessories of defense. 
Hills here form an advantageous site. Torpedoes will of course be in 
readiness, and barracks built, as at Greytown, sufficient for the use of 
a much larger force than will ordinarily be kept on duty. 

No matter how strong the land defenses may be at Brito, however, 
ships will have to be sent to aid the defense there at the outbreak of 
any war threatening the destruction of the canal. At this port torpedo 
boats and automobile torpedoes will be of great service. 

From Brito an outpost would be thrown out to La Flor and small 
earthworks built there, as at Ochoa, and a sufficient force be maintained 
in time of war to prevent any danger of a flank attack from Corinto 
or San Juan del Sur. This is a healthy region, though hot, and the 
health of a garrison need not suffer. 

It is believed that no other defensive works would be needed to 
protect the canal. Probably, however, it would be found well to estab¬ 
lish a sanitary camp on one of the islands of the lake whose climate is 
good, or to place such a camp in the high region of Matagalpa, or, 
better still, at the sanitary springs near Cartago in Costa Rica. 

The writer has been gratified to learn that this general scheme of 
defense, previously advocated by him, is substantially the same as 
that advanced by First Lieut. L. D. Greene, Seventh L r . S. Infantry, 
who in writing upon the same subject, and courteously permitting the 
writer to quote from him, says: 

To practically defend the canal we would require heavy sea batteries at its ocean 
extremities armed with guns of equal power to those carried by first-class battle 
ships. The lake itself forms a vast harbor over a 100 miles long by 40 miles wide 
where our navies could ride at ease in fresh water and comparatively free from the 
marine growths that so quickly foul the bottoms of ships and particularly of steel 
ships in tropical seas, always ready to sally forth to strike blows upon either the 
Atlantic or Pacific coast, thus being equal in eifective force to fleets of the same size, 
with present communication, one being stationed in either ocean and separated from 
each other by some 12,000 miles or six weeks or more of time. 

In the seacoast batteries will be habitually kept sufficient garrisons to guard and 
care for the property and guns, while the main military force can be massed at one 
or two central points upon the healthful and breezy uplands, whence the seacoast 
garrisons could be changed by periodical details, the whole or any part of the com¬ 
mand ready to move to either the east or west coast as required, at a day’s notice. 

Doubtless the fortifications of the termini is a vital point to be in¬ 
sisted on, but as to the wisdom of stationing in Nicaragua a peripatetic 
command, there is a diversity of opinion. The writer has traversed 
Nicaragua from Corinto to Greytown, suffered from its intolerable 
heats, and journeyed its almost impenetrable and fever-haunted jun¬ 
gles, and feels far from assured of the ease of moving a war column 
across that country, which march previously seemed not difficult from 
careful study of the map. Communication by canal will be easy, but 
if water transportation fails the movement of troops will be very diffi¬ 
cult—impossible, in fact, in certain parts of the country, owing to the 
ruggedness and impracticability of the roads, which can be constructed 
and maintained in good repair only at great cost. The wisdom of estab¬ 
lishing a great naval station in the lake may also be questioned, in 
spite of the great advantages given by the fresh water. The lake is 
too far inland, too difficult of access in hurry and need, and harbors of 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


45 


refuge must be placed in the most accessible and easily protected points 
on the coast. Doubtless docks and repair stations will be established 
in the lake, which, in time of peace or for disabled vessels in war, will 
be of great value; bnt to establish in the heart of the isthmus a com¬ 
fortable nest for war ships, where they may lie at ease, passively await¬ 
ing the approach of the enemy on either coast that he may select as an 
object of attack, would surely weaken the whole defense, which it would 
seem would be best accomplished by war ships cruising at sea against 
the enemy, or concentrating near the threatened coasts, thus forming 
the outer line of real coast defenses, and by constantly threatening 
attack exercising the best defense. 

In the event of war, especially with England, it would be vital to 
the interests of the United States to hold the Nicaragua Canal; not 
only to aid the home defense, but because, should the canal fall into the 
enemy’s hands, our coasts would be doubly in danger from cruisers, 
and our land frontiers seriously threatened by the ease of movement of 
troops from Australia and the Pacific colonies, possibly from India. In 
such a war the United States must hold the canal to the end; or, as a 
last resort, must disable it lor a time, rather than allow it to become 
available for the use of the enemy. But the necessity for disabling the 
canal would be merely a remote possibility if proper and timely means 
are taken by the United States to secure its safety. 

Such is the writer’s view of the military aspects of the Nicaragua 
Canal. It may be thought that too much is taken for granted in assum¬ 
ing United States control of the present canal, in view of the terms of 
the concession granted to the company by Nicaragua; of the treaty 
obligations of that country, and of the United States; and of the claims 
to ownership which may be shared by all nationalities. Indeed it 
seems to be the common belief that the canal now in process of con¬ 
struction is a mere private undertaking with which the Government of 
the United States has no concern beyond the fact of charter and the 
protection of citizens engaged in an enterprise in a foreign and distant 
region. Yet such is not held to be the fact, and the interest of the 
United States in the Nicaragua Canal has been recently and strongly 
affirmed in the Senate.* But long before this present enterprise had 
taken form, it was announced by one of our great statesmen, William 
M. Evarts, when Secretary of State, that “The United States (there¬ 
fore) as the great commercial and political power of America, became 
necessarily a principal party to any project which shall exhibit such 
solidity and proportions as to distinguish it Ijom the unsubstantial and 
illusory schemes which have, from time to time, proposed to solve the 
problem of interoceanic transit. 

Whether events shall prove the present enterprise to be a success or 
a failure, the project has certainly passed beyond the stage of an 
“ unsubstantial and illusory scheme,” and the United States lias become 
a principal party to it. 

Already she has shown indications of an intention to assume control 
of the canal. On February 14,1893, Mr. Quay submitted tp the Senate 
an amendment which read as follows: “This act shall not take effect 
until the Government of the United States shall have secured by con¬ 
vention with the Governments of Costa Kica and Nicaragua, the right 
to fortify and garrison tbp termini or the proposed canal upon the 
Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and to maintain one or more armed vessels 
upon the Lake of Nicaragua, and to move military forces through the 


See Senate Doc. 52d Congress, 2d Session, Report No. 1142, Dec. 22, 1892. 



46 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


territory of either of those States for the purpose of protecting the 
canal and the persons of citizens of the United States operating the 
same.” But before this policy can be carried into effect not only must 
the United States rid herself beyond question of the embarrassing 
Olayton-Bulwer treaty, but she must obtain the release of Nicaragua 
from probable treaty obligations with other nations; and must obtain 
from Nicaragua and Costa liica privileges not now granted; and in 
assuming protection the United States Government must in justice 
recognize the rights of the company which has undertaken, alone and 
without support, to solve the problem of interoceanic communication. 

The importance of the United States having control of the great 
enterprise can not be better summed up than in the convincing words of 
the present chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign delations, 
Mr. Morgan, of Alabama, who says: 

The national power that controls the transit of ships across the Istlimns of Darien 
must necessarily he one of the greatest powers in the worhl in its influence on com¬ 
merce and naval warfare. 

It is a simple and inadequate illustration of the military feature of the subject to 
say that it requires two fleets, separated by 12,000 miles of sailing distance, to 
blockade one fleet of equal power to either in Lake Nicaragua. But this doubling 
of the power of a fleet at anchor in Lake Nicaragua over that of any other great 
maritime power that is moving across the Atlantic or Pacilic to attack our coasts is 
but a small part of the strategic advantages of such a situation. 

As a point d'appui, a- foothold from which to attack or defend, to threaten or protect 
all the coasts of this hemisphere and the islands and adjacent seas, it is more a point 
of commanding power in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans than Gibraltar is in the 
Mediterranean Sea. * * * 

The only question * * * is, whether we shall delay its assertion while it may 

be peacefully accomplished until some future time when its cost will be incalculable 
in money, in the sacrifices of war, and in the loss of precious lives. * * * 

When all the maritime powers shall meet in this isthmian canal it will be found 
that the best if not the only guaranty of peace and justice in the common use of the 
canal will be the power of some great nation having the right to control it. With¬ 
out some such guaranty the canal and the states through which it is located would 
only become a temptation to the cupidity of the great maritime powers. 

We can decline this duty if we prefer to sacrifice our coast trade Avitb the Pacfic 
States, or greatly to embarrass it, and if we prefer to see some great commercial nation 
interpose betAveen us and South America, and the naA r v of some great European 
poAver in command of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. * * * 

In also quoting from Senator Morgan, First Lieut. L. D. Greene, U. 
S. Army, in an essay on this subject, adds: 

It is, however, assumed by all the world that if this waterway is built the United 
States must stand its sponsor, and it matters little how we start. We will haA r e this 
responsibility thrust upon us sooner or later as has England in the care of the 
Suez Canal. * 

It can hardly be doubted that long before the Nicaragua Canal can 
be completed, the United States will have found some way by which 
national control of the political and military relations will have been 
effected to the injury of none, with honor to the State, and in accord¬ 
ance with treaty obligations and private rights. The question of 
ownership will be no more a factor in the.military control of the canal 
than it has proved at Panama and Suez; and no doubt the United 
States will avoid all commercial interference. 

But no matter who may be the owners, who the concessionaires, or 
what the terms of the concession, the interest of the United States in 
the Nicaragua Canal is supreme. Whether she will see tit to assert 
this claim as a Government, before the canal is completed, and give her 
powerful aid to success; or whether she will refuse all interference until 
the work has been accomplished, is not for the writer to consider. 
Whatever the action may be, there seems to be little doubt of the fact 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


47 


that the people of the United States are the parties chiefly interested 
in the Nicaragua Canal, and that the Government must alone and 
effectively guard this highway across her continent—this part of her 
own coast line. 

That the United States will dominate any canal ever built across 
America is the confident belief of the writer, and that such an inter- 
oceanic canal will ultimately be constructed is characteristic of the 
energy and enterprise now prevalent at this dawn of the twentieth 
century. 


Appendix 1. 


CLIMATIC CONDITIONS OF NICARAGUA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE 
TO MILITARY OPERATIONS ON LAND. 

By Brig. Gen. A. W. Greely, U. S. A., Chief Signal Officer. 

It is now recognized that making war is in itself a science, wlieretp, 
as strongly illustrated by the career of Von Moltke, the most success¬ 
ful soldier brings the greatest store of useful knowledge from other 
branches of science. 

The coordinated and systematized information which the typical 
soldier of bygone days held in contempt is now a prerequisite to suc¬ 
cess. The day too has passed when either thoughtful students of war 
or critics of military operations are willing to ignore the preventable 
loss of life through disease any more than through other faulty action 
of a commanding general. 

The military history of our own time repeats that of other centuries, 
and leads us, as especially pertinent to Nicaragua, to reecho the words 
of Dr. Moseley in his u Tropical Diseases” when lie says: 

In military expeditions where the choice of time and season are within the will 
of the enterprise it is wonderful that they, should ever be chosen so as to defeat the 
undertaking-. 

The United States through its geographical situation and its disin¬ 
clination to foreign wars has had but little experience in military 
operations within the torrid zone. Each tropical country presents 
peculiar disadvantages for military operations, not only through its 
physical configuration, but also through its climatic elements and 
attendant diseases; hence each country must be studied and considered 
by itself. In connection with tropical countries little known, such as 
the Central American republics, it is necessary not only to gather up 
the few scattered and imperfect data relative to climatic conditions, 
together with topographic peculiarities of the country, but also to study 
the past, whereby errors costly in lives and destructive to reputation 
may be avoided. 

Doubtless the most instructive information, relative to the difficulties 
of military operations by land on the route of the proposed Nicaraguan 
Canal, is to be obtained from the accounts of the English expedition of 
1780, which reduced the fort of San Juan, Nicaragua. The expedition 
was originated by General Dalling, then governor of Jamaica, with a 
view to take Fort San Juan on the Rio San Juan, obtain possession of 
the cities of Granada and Leon, and thus sever communications of the 
Spaniards between their northern and southern possessions in America. 

Commencing with the capture and occupation of the strategic point 
aimed at, with practically no loss of life, there is scarcely an instance 
in military annals where the subsequent mortality is so proportionately 
excessive. And this loss of life, resulting from climatic and prevent¬ 
able causes, was the outcome of Dalling’s failure to fully appreciate, 
and profit by, the terrible object lessons presented by previous English 
48 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


49 


experiences in tropical America. Not only liad Vernon’s expedition to 
Carthagena during tlie rainy season of 1741 entailed the loss of 20,000 
lives, but sundry other disasters of the same character and due to similar 
causes had marked England’s military operations in adjacent countries. 
The absolutely imperative necessity of wisely choosing his time, so as 
to land the expedition in Nicaragua at the beginningof the dry season, 
failed to impress itself on Dalling’s mind, with results so disastrous 
that they should ever remain fixed in the minds of future chieftains in 
Nicaraguan warfare. 

The immortal Nelson, then a captain, was given command of the 
naval forces, while Major Poison commanded the troops. Dalling 
ordered Nelson to convoy the troop transports and supervise the land¬ 
ing of the army; afterwards Poison was to seize upon Fort San Juan, 
which Avas to be eventually a grand depot of provisions garrisoned by 
a suitable body of regular troops. The original land force consisting 
of 500 men, of Avhorn 200 were regulars, arrived on March 24 in good 
health, at the Eio San Juan, where they were reinforced by a consider¬ 
able number of the Mosquito Indians, who at that time w ere said to 
number from 7,000 to 10,000 fighting men. How many Indians ac¬ 
companied the expedition is not set forth, but it is evident they were 
in considerable numbers. 

Nelson, recognizing the hazardous character of the expedition and 
the utter ignorance by any man of the party regarding the Eio San 
Juan, exceeded his orders, manned the water-transportation and per¬ 
sonally supervised the transportation of the soldiers some 50 miles to 
the island of San Bartholomew, 16 miles below the castle San Juan. 

The troops had landed at the mouth of the Eio San Juan on the 28th 
of March, 1780, near the end of the dry season. The low state of the 
river not only entailed great hardship in connection with the forcing 
of the boats through the shallow water, but also necessitated frequent 
and prolonged exertion in the stream, an experience always dangerous 
under a tropical sun. 

“The men,” says Clarke in his life of Nelson, “were much exposed to 
injury from the violence of the sun for seven or eight hours every day* 
besides a still more intense heat that was reflected from many dry 
shoals, covered with a whitish sand, which sometimes rendered the air 
intolerable, and this was followed by as dangerous an exposure to the 
heavy dews at night.” 

Dr. Moseley’s account, in “Tropical Diseases,” of the conditions 
under which the march was made accord so fully with the reports of 
disinterested travelers that they are quoted; he says: 

The heat of the climate must necessarily be excessive. And this is augmented in 
the course of the river, by high woods without sufficient intervals, in many places, 
to admit of being refreshed by the winds. * * * 

The river has in its course many noisome marshes on its sides, and the trees are so 
thick as to intercept the rays of the sun, consequently, the earth beneath their 
branches is covered with rotten leaves and putrid vegetation. Hence arise copious 
collections of foul vapors which clog the atmosphere. These unite with large clouds 
and precipitate in rain. The rains are no sooner over than the sun breaks forth and 
shines with scorching heat. The surface of the ground in places not covered with 
trees is scarcely dry before the atmosphere is again loaded by another collection of 
clouds and exhalations, and the sun is again concealed. * * * 

In the rainy season of the year months successively pass away in this sort of vicis¬ 
situdes without the least diminution of heat, excepting at nights, when the air is 
poisoned with noxious chilling dews. 

The country was so unfavorable to travel that although San Juan 
castle was situated only 69 miles from the mouth of the river the troops 
did not arrive before it until the 11th of A$ril. Ignoring the rapid 


S. Ex. 74-4 



50 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


advance of the wet season. Poison decided not to carry the castle by 
storm, but laid siege to it. On tin* 24th of April the castle capitulated 
with the loss of two killed and ten wounded among the attacking party, 
and they congratulated themselves on their easy victory. “But,” says 
Clarke, “bad weather setting in the whole army, both sailors, soldiers, 
and Indians, began to fall sick, especially the latter * * * and 

soon afterwards the disaffection and desertion of the Indians became 
general.” 

Dr. Moseley in his account says: 

From the unfortunate delay before the castle, which surrendered when it was 
summoned, the season for the Spring periodical rains with their concomitant diseases 
now advanced; and the little army had lost the opportunity of pushing rapidly on, 
out of those horrid woods by which they were environed to the dry, pleasant, and 
healthful plains and agreeable towns of Granada and Leon, near the lake, in the 
province of Nicaragua, which, from its salubrity and situation, is justly termed by 
the Spaniards Mahomet's Paradise. * * * 

But they were shut up in the castle as soon as they were in possession of it. The 
troops and Indians were attacked with fluxes and intermittents, and in want of 
almost every necessary, for the river was become so swollen and rapid by the rains 
that the navigation from the harbor, where the provisions and stores were, was 
tedious and almost impracticable. Here the troops, deserted by those Indians who 
had not already perished, languished in extreme misery, and gradually moldered 
away until there was not sufficient strength alive to attend the sick, nor to bury 
the dead. * * * 

The Spaniards retook the castle as soon as the season permitted. 

From the cruise of the convoys and transports a thousand seamen 
lost their lives, and afterwards Kelson said of his ship’s crew : 

Of the 200, one hundred and forty-five were buried in my and Collingwood’s time, 
and I believe that not more than ten survived of that ship's crew. 

With reference to the land forces Moseley adds: 

Of about 1,800 people who were sent to different posts, at different embarkations, 
to connect and form the various dependencies of this expedition, few of the Euro¬ 
peans retained their health above sixteen days, and not more than 380 ever returned, 
and those chiefly in miserable condition. (Many imbecile or insane.) 

In view of the past, then, it behooves one to carefully consider such 
climatic data as are accessible. It appears that there have been fewer 
meteorological observations made in Central America than in any other 
region of equal area of the continent of North America, so that only 
about a half dozen set of such observations are extant. 

Fortunately, however, those few observations, as regards their fluc¬ 
tuations, whether considered with reference to diurnal, monthly, or 
annual change, are so fully in accord that they enable one to speak with 
considerable certainty of the whole area of Nicaragua. Such detailed 
data as are available are hereto appended. 

Of primary importance is the rain, a blessing to temperate climes but 
the scourge of tropical seaboards, save in a few well known localities. 

Rainfall data exists for the following four stations in Central America, 
where the amounts are not excessive, being for the year as follows: 
Rivas, Nicaragua, 74.53 inches; Panama, 66.78 inches; Gfautemala, 56.82 
inches, and San Jose, Costa Rica, 65.48 inches. Over a narrow strip 
on the Atlantic coast, as shown by observations at Bluefield, Colon, and 
Greytown, the rainfall differs very materially from those already men¬ 
tioned. A description given by an officer of the U. S. Navy, based on 
nine months’ service at Colon, indicates the prevailing conditions. He 
tersely says: “It rains every day and every other day it pours.” For 
obvious reasons rainfall data at Colon have not been collated and spread 
broadcast by the Panam^ Canal Company, hence its total amount, as 
here given, rests on the authority of Schott at 121.60 inches for the year. 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


51 


At Bluefields, Mosquito coast, north of Greytown, the value of the 
annual rainfall, dependent upon a short record of less than three years, 
is given as 92.42 inches. The Nicaragua Canal Construction Company, 
with a sagacity and frankness greatly to their credit, have carefully 
measured the rainfall at Greytown for a period of three and one-half 
years, from which observations the annual rainfall is placed at 259.19 
inches, an amount that is scarcely exceeded at any other point on the 
face of the earth, except at exposed stations on the mountainous west¬ 
ern coast of India. This excessive precipitation occurs, however, only 
on the immediate coast, and is due to the strong northeast trade winds 
which blow almost continuously on that shore. 

Its annual amount is always the most important characteristic of the 
rainfall of any locality, yet oftentimes, as in Nicaragua, its peculiar 
distribution throughout the year is a question of great and vital import¬ 
ance. 

The rainfall fluctuations of the interior and the western coast of 
Nicaragua, and indeed of all Central America, are sharply defined. 
The seasons are divided into the dry with little or no rain, covering 
about four months, and wet, when rain falls almost daily and in con¬ 
siderable quantities, lasting about five months. The wet season dom¬ 
inates from June to October, and in some instances even extends into 
November. During this period the rains are heavy and rarely inter¬ 
mittent. At Rivas, on Lake Nicaragua, no less than 91 per cent of 
the rainfall of the year falls between the 1st of May and the last of 
October, while from January to April, inclusive, rain is exceedingly 
rare, and of varied amounts, being, as a rule, less than 2 per cent of 
that for the year. At Guatemala 93 per cent of the year’s rain falls 
from May to October, inclusive, and only 4 per cent from December to 
March, inclusive. At San Jose, Costa Rica, almost practically the 
same conditions obtain, the rainfall from May to October, inclusive, 
being 85 per cent, and from December to March, inclusive, 5 per cent 
of that of the year. At Panama there is a tendency of the rainy 
season to be one month later, 87 per cent of the year’s rain falling from 
June to November, inclusive, and 8 per cent from December to March, 
inclusive. 

The distribution of rainfall throughout the months of the year differ 
greatly on the Atlantic coast from other parts of Nicaragua. There 
is really no dry season on the immediate coast region, although there is 
an interruption to the heavy rains from about the middle of February 
to the middle of April and throughout the month of September. Rains 
are excessive from June to August, inclusive, with the maximum in 
July, when the rainfall averages 38-J6 inches. After a respite in Sep¬ 
tember the heavy rains renew in October and continue well into Jan¬ 
uary. From the last of January to the early part of April rain intermits 
along the coast to a considerable extent, and occasionally several days 
will pass with no rain whatever. In some years, notably 1891, Feb¬ 
ruary and March are almost rainless months, but such a condition is 
abnormal. 

Of necessity, from its geographical situation, Nicaragua is a warm 
climate, the average monthly temperature at Greytown ranging from 
75° in January, the coldest month, to 81° in June, the warmest month. 
However, the prevalence for the greater part of the year of the north¬ 
east trade winds makes the temperature very endurable, especially in 
the shade. 

At Greytown the temperature rarely rises above 85° or sinks below 
70°, and in three years and four months it exceeded 90° only once, in 


52 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 


the month of October, 1891, when a maximum of 95° occurred. Con¬ 
versely, the lowest temperature recorded in that period was 65° in March, 
1892. Indeed, while Nicaragua is necessarily a warm country, yet, 
owing to the contiguity of the two great oceans, the temperatures are 
abnormally low and exceedingly equitable. The temperature condi¬ 
tions which obtain at Greytown accord closely with those of Rivas in the 
interior, and in fact may be considered characteristic of the whole of 
Nicaragua. 

It is obvious, then, that land operations in Nicaragua are not only 
extremely difficult from the physical conditions of the country, as set 
forth by Capt. Scriven, but also that they are quite impossible save 
during the dry season of the year, from January to April. 

Any military force sent to Nicaragua should reach the coast not later 
than the early days of January, at which period not only is the wet 
season drawing to its end but the streams, yet full, are suitable for 
water transportation. January is also the coolest month of the year, 
so that troops have opportunity to become accustomed to the increasing 
heat of the year, a heat which the great humidity of the atmosphere 
makes most trying and oppressive to unacclimated persons. 

It is further evident that the proposed coast defenses at the mouth 
of the Rio San Juan can be maintained only at great expense of life. 
The experience of the employes of the Nicaraguan Canal Construction 
Company is, as Capt. Scriven remarks, fro criterion by which to judge 
of the probable effects of the climate upon a body of troops. It is 
impossible for a considerable military force to be maintained in the 
same state of health as this selected body of intelligent employes, 
whose condition as regards not only food, clothing, and shelter (as 
well as their regular lives), are superior to those of troops, but whose 
qualities of healthfulness and prudence are also important adjuncts to 
health. 

Over-exertion in hours of drill or other military exercises, neglect to 
speedily change wet clothing, unnecessary exposure to dews at night 
or to the sun by day, are the imprudences which bear hardest on the 
preservation of health in that climate, yet they are extremely difficult 
of efficacious enforcement among a body of troops. The clothing should 
be thin but durable, and the underclothing of light flannel, while every 
man should be provided with a rubber blanket as an absolutely neces¬ 
sary protection against the ground at night and rain by day. 

Better and more suitable food, improved clothing and camp equipage 
would undoubtedly make the loss of an invading army in the wet sea¬ 
son in Nicaragua much less than that of Balling, yet even the modern 
methods of campaigning in temperate climes would fail to preserve 
any military force on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua from speedily 
becoming a disabled force unfit for action or field operations. 

If the mouth of the canal is ever fortified, its main garrison would 
necessarily be quartered in the healthy region around Lake Nicaragua, 
from which detachments could be sent on a detail of a month for duty 
on the coast. 

It is thus apparent that the establishment of a military post in Nica¬ 
ragua or the occupation of the country by a body of troops is a problem 
which demands in all its details unusual sagacity as regards the supply 
of food, the stock of clothing, the means of transportation, and the 
housing of troops. To satisfactorily prearrange such details for a large 
force would tax the best ability of the various departments of the 
American army ; yet such provisions must be made before such force 
quits the confines of the United States, in order to avoid the terrible 


NICARAGUA CANAL. 53 

loss by disease, which, greater than that of the bullet at all times, is 
disproportionately so in most tropical campaigns. 


Amount of rainfall at Guatemala, Panama, Bluefields {Nicaragua), Rivas (Nicaragua), 

and San Jose (Costa Rica). 

GUATEMALA. 

Latitude 14° 40' N.; longitude 90° 30' W. Authority: Revista Obs. Met. Natl. Centl. Inst, Guatemala, 
1856-1882, and Met. Zietschrift, 1850-1851.] 


Year. 

Jan. 

Feb. 

Mar. 

Apr. 

May. 

June. 

July. 

Aug. 

Sept. 

Oct. 

Nov. 

Dec. 

An¬ 

nual. 


In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

1850 . 









7. 01 

17. 87 

1.38 

3. 23 


1851. 

.39 

.00 

1.42 

.43 

9. 06 

14. 21 

22.64 

11 . 81 

13! 23 


1856 . 

.12 

.00 

.23 

.47 

5. 35 

13. 98 

11.74 

12.17 

10. 99 

6.85 

.55 

.53 


1857 . 

.18 

.02 

.58 

2..09 

5.31 

13.27 

11. 72 

11.11 

5. 39 

3.53 

1.08 

.24 

. 

1858 .. 

.50 

.02 

1.66 

1.87 

5. 76 

12. 84 

11.24 

4.49 

8 . 38 

3.24 

.07 

.10 

...... 

1859. 

.39 

.13 

1.94 

2. 30 

8 . 06 

10.07 

5.95 

8.81 

11.42 

9.48 

.51 

.19 

. 

1860 . 

,15 

.07 

.10 

2.03 

3. 26 

6 . 41 

7. 02 

9. 26 

9. 36 

9. 82 

.10 

.74 

. 

1861. 

.12 

.15 

.52 

6 . 87 

8.15 

12 . 86 

13.14 

9.13 

9. 50 

9. 96 

.63 

.66 

. 

1862 . 

.48 

.07 

.00 

.00 

3.31 

12. 57 

8 . 22 

11.06 

8 . 01 

4. 02 

.11 

.13 

. 

1863 . 

.37 

.03 

1.52 

.36 

7.30 

10. 34 

6 . 46 

3. 90 

5. 93 

3.81 

2.59 

.14 

. 

1864 . 

.18 

.75 

.04 

1.09 

2. 57 

11. 67 

5. 35 

8.10 

9. 56 

9. 54 

.51 

.41 

. 

1879 . 



. 28 

2. 53 

3.02 

10.72 

15. 56 

10. 52 

9. 66 

7. 37 

.43 

. 14 


1880 . 

.37 

.22 

.06 

.79 

5. 68 

9. 95 

5. 40 

9. 20 

9. 08 

6 . 26 

2! 35 

.07 


1881. 

1.66 

.03 

.01 

.46 

2. 84 

10.26 

7. 29 

9.60 

10.70 

8 .93 

1.41 

.00 

. 

1882 . 

.01 

.14 

.00 

2.24 

3. 07 

6 . 68 

2 . 86 

11.46 

14. 06 

8 . 24 

.72 

.00 

. 

Means. 

.38 

.13 

.60 

1.68 

5. 20 

11.13 

9. 76 

9.26 

9. 49 

7.78 

.89 

.47 

56.77 


PANAMA. 

[Latitude 9° N., longitude 80° W. Authority: M. de Lesseps; Comptes Rendues, Feb.26,1883.] 


1879 . 

.04 

2.52 

5.71 

5. 55 

10. 28 

6. 46 

7. 91 

7. 24 

9. 02 

9. 80 

19. 21 

.98 

84.72 

1880 . 

1.89 

.12 

.16 

1.61 

4.45 

0. 00 

9. 88 

11.46 

7. 91 

11. 81 

6.46 

5. 51 

66. 26 

1881. 

.16 

.16 

.35 

3. 23 

10.35 

13.78 

7. 20 

4.49 

8. 94 

9.69 

9.72 

2.48 

70. 50 

1882 .. 

.00 1 

.12 

.00 

.98 

5. 24 

6.18 

5. 35 

4. 06 

4. 06 

6. 69 

10.91 

2. 01 

45. 60 

Means. 

.52 | 

.73 

1. 56 

2.84 

7. 58 

7. 86 

7. 58 

6.81 

7.48 

9.50 

11.58 

2.74 

66.78 


BLUEFIELDS, NICARAGUA. 

[Latitude 12° N, longitude 83° 43' W. Authority: International Bulletin.] 


1883 . 



I 






3.42 
5.82 
8. 07 

8.13 
4. 99 
2. 69 

12.13 
9. 71 
7. 70 

17. 00 
11.15 
3.15 


1884 . 

1885 ..:. 

10.25 
1. 96 
7.28 

6.39 
1.60 
*3.94 j 

! 3.21 
2.66 

1.63 

2.06 

2.87 

2.67 
5. 89 

8. 01 
13. 37 

17. 06 
19.82 
?.00 

16.40 
11.75 
8.55 

97. 72 
81.53 

1886 

Means. 









6.50 

4.16 | 

2.50 

2.46 

4.28 

10. 69 

18. 44 

12.23 

5. 77 

5. 27 

9. 85 

10.43 

92.58 



*24 days. 


RIVAS, NICARAGUA. 


[Latitude, 11° 26' N.; longitude, 85° 47' W. Elevation, 150 feet. Authority, United States Weather 

Bureau.] 


1882 .. 

1883 .. 

1884 .. 

1885 .. 

1886 .. 

1887 .. 

1888 .. 
1889 .. 

1891 .. 

1892 .. 

1893 .. 






4.26 

8. 80 

4.04 

6.25 





1.00 

8. 07 

4.33 

4. 34 

.59 

! .61 

.00 

2. 03 

2.80 

10. 43 

4.98 

3. 84 

.04 


.00 


1.78 

7.26 

4.81 

2. 76 

.06 

[ *.13* 


’” 64 ’ 

24.91 

13. 71 

38. 20 

53.02 

.90 

l .81 

.00 

.00 

9.17 

8. 17 

4.10 

5. 03 

1.83 

1 .04 

.00 

.00 i 

7.12 

8. 50 

4.18 

5. 00 

.05 

I/. 19 . 

.00 

1.71 j 

11.34 

11.64 



.19 

.00 


.00 

13. 30 

9. 80 

9.19 

7.48 

.06 

Trace 

".’66' 

• U 

20.03 

21.14 

13. 22 

18. 70 

.46 j 

.15 

.01 

.56 

9. 57 

10.75 

1 

9.67 ; 

11.82 


7.65 

23. 38 

5.78 

18. 25 

4. 48 

15.83 

5.40 

7. 83 

15. 30 

10. 85 


22.47 

9. 80 

16.80 

12.42 

14. 90 

12. 22 

21.26 

14. 00 

13. 56 

9.67 

16. 51 


4.20 

1.61 


5.70 

.34 


7.43 

2. 24 

. 

4.36 

1.71 


3.75 

.49 


2. 50 

2. 31 

.. 

1.11 

1.13 

. 

2.34 

2. 67 


4. 40 

.43 


2.44 

2. 50 

. 

3. 82 

1.54 

74. 53 


Means 





















































































































54 


NICARAGUA CANAL 


SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA. 


Latitude, 9° 56' N; longitude, 84° 7' W. Elevation 3, 757 feet. Authority, Anales de Institute Fisico 

Geografico Nacional, 1889, San Jose, 1890.J 


Year. 

Jan. 

Feb. 

Mar. 

Apr. 

May. 

J line. 

July. 

Aug. 

Sept. 

Oct. 

Nov. 

Dec. 

An¬ 

nual. 


In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

In. 

1866 . 

1.30 

.28 

.00 

1.14 

5.47 

4. 84 

12. 60 

6.14 

10. 79 

9. 84 

6.73 

4.80 

63.93 

1867 . 

3.86 

2.21 

.38 

3 86 

8.23 

8.11 

8. 43 

7.48 

12. 36 

8. 39 

9.61 

.55 

73.47 

1868 . 

.00 

.00 

7.13 

.01 

3.27 

5.91 

4.02 

5.12 

8.82 

15.47 

5. 67 

.67 

56. 09 

1869 . 

.28 

.00 

.28 

1.10 

7. 95 

8. 58 

5.91 

5. 20 

15.47 

11.06 

3. 07 

4. 02 

62.92. 

1870 . 

.04 

.24 

l. 22 

.67 

13.11 

10. 87 

9. 45 

11.18 

9. 45 

10.32 

7. 24 

1.30 

75. 09 

1871. 

1.10 

.12 

.32 

.51 

11.42 

7.99 

14. 33 

12. 09 

9. 65 

13.11 

4.49 

.43 

75. 56 

1872 . 

.12 

. 12 

.59 

1.97 

9. 61 

10. 04 

7.56 

14.88 

15. 63 

19. 84 

5. 59 

.83 

86. 78 

1873 . 

2. 52 

.00 

.12 

2.80 

2. 52 

8. 07 

5.71 

3. 35 

15. 24 

10. 32 

4.76 

.43 

55. 84 

1874 . 

1.81 

.04 

,79 

2. 36 

13. 23 

6.57 

6. 38 

.7.13 

12. 56 

7. 52 

1.65 

.79 

60. 83 

1875 . 

.00 

.00 

.00 

1.10 

9. 92 

7.09 

3.66 

11.57 

10.98 

13.35 

.83 

1. 26 

59. 76 

1876 . 

.55 

.00 

.43 

.24 

9. 72 

9. 33 

6.02 

7. 56 

8.11 

4. 61 

2. 76 

1.10 

50. 43 

1877 . 

.55 

.00 

.00 

.00 

9.45 

6. 57 

8. 78 

6. 26 

10. 20 

3. 74 

4. 76 

3.11 

53. 42 

1878 . 

.00 

.00 

1.50 

1.97 

3. 59 

7.36 

8. 07 

5. 87 

12. 99 

9.37 

8. 78 

.79 

60. 29 

1879 . 

.51 

.00 

1.77 

7.56 

8. 66 

12.99 

>8.11 

11.14 

13. 82 

9. 09 

2.40 

.32 

86.37 

1880 . 

.32 

.00 

.00 

.59 

10. 00 

8.27 

4. 09 

17.17 

6. 50 

10.94 

3.62 

.00 

61. 50' 

Means. 

.86 

.20 

.97 

1. 73 

8.41 

8.17 

8. 21 

8. 81 

11.50 

10.46 

4. 80 

1. 36 

65.48 


Record of meteorological observations made at Greytown, Nicaragua, under direction of Dr. 

J. E. Stubbert, Nicaragua Canal Company . 


i 


January ... 
February. 

March_ 

Aprjl.. 

May.. 

June.. 

July. 

August... 

September 

October 

November 

December. 


Year 


January ... 
February . 

March_ 

April. 

May.. 

June. 

July. 

August 

September 

October 

November 

December. 

Year 


1890. 


1891. 


1892. 

January . 

February. 

March. 

April. 

May. 

June. 

July. 

August. 

September. 

October. 

November. 

December.. 

Year. 


1893. 

January. 

February. 

March. 

April. 

May. 


Temperature. 

Total 

Mean daily. 

Maximum. 

Minimum. 

rainfall. 

-'O 

O' 

0 

Inches. 

75 

81 

70 

26 -80. 

76 

80 

72 

6-36 

77 

81 

73 

5-93 

75 

78 

72 

18-11 

76 

80 

72 

4-93 

79 

84 

74 

46 -84 

78 

81 

75 

52 -55 

78 

81-5 

75 

35 -72 

83 

89-5 

75 

8-14 

77 

80 -5 

74 

24 -36 

76-5 

82 

71 

25 - 55 

76-5 

81 

72 

41 -65 

77 -3 

89 -5 

70 

296 -94 

74 

81 

67 

20 -30 

76 

80 

72-7 

2-57 

77 T 

81 -3 

74 

1 -95 

79-7 

81-7 

77 

10 -40 

79 -5 

86 

73 

13-78 

79-7 

85 -5 

74 

26 -95 

80 

86 

74 

23-57 

79 

83 

75 

19 -49 

80 

86 

74 

14-16 

77 -5 

95 

72 

20-21 

78 

86 

71 

28 T5 

76 

84 

68 

32 -74 

78-1 

95 

67 

214 -27 

75-7 

83 -5 

68 

28-57 

77 

80 

74 

11 *38 

78-7 

88 

65 

4-98 

78 

81 

72 

18-38 

80 -7 

85 

74 

50 -88 

83-5 

90 

77 

13 -42 

81 

85 

76 

38 -96 

77-5 

86 

72 

23-63 

77 -3 

87 

72 

11-47 

77 -4 

87-5 

70 -5 

27 -95 

76-1 

84 -2 

70 -8 

36-93 

75 ‘4 

83 

67-5 

24 -65 

78-2 

90 

65 

291 -20 

75 

83 

67-5 

17 -70 

76-1 

83 

67-5 

7-53 

77 -2 

85 

67 

3-93 

77 -5 

86 -5 

70 

9-99 

2-77 


1 
















































































































NICARAGUA CANAL. 


55 


Record of meteorological observations made at Greytown, Nicaragua, under direction of Dr. 

J. E. Stubbert, Nicaragua Canal Company. 

[Values, deduced from observations at Greytown, Nicaragua, from January, 1890, to April and May, 

1893.] 



Temperature. 

Total 


Mean daily. 

Maximum. 

Minimum. 

rainfall. 

J anuary. 

0 

74-9 

O' 

83 -5 

0 

67 

Inches. 

23-34 

February. 

76 -3 

83 

67-5 

6-98 

March. . 

77-5 

88 

65 

4-20 

April. 

77 -6 

86-5 

70 

14-22 

May.. 

78 -7 

86 

72 

18 -09 

June... 

80-7 

90 

74 

29 -07 

-July.-... 

79-7 

86 

74 

38 -36 

August. 

78 -2 

86 

72 

26 -28 

September. 

SOT 

89 -5 

72 

11-26 

October. 

77 -3 

95 

70 -5 

24 -17 

November.. 

76 -9 

86 

70 -8 

30 -21 

December. 

76-0 

84 

67-5 

33 -01 

Year. 

77-8 

95 

65 

259 -19 


o 


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